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Abstract
With the advent of low-cost and high-quality digital imaging devices and the avail-
ability of user-friendly and powerful image-editing software, digital images can be
easily manipulated without leaving obvious traces. The credibility of digital images
if often challenged when they are presented as crucial evidence for news photogra-
phy, scientific discovery, law enforcement, etc. In this context, digital image forensics
emerges as an essential approach for ensuring the credibility of digital images.
Sensor pattern noise mainly consists of the photo response non-uniformity
noise arising primarily from the manufacturing imperfections and the inhomogeneity
of silicon wafers during the manufacturing process. It has been proven to be an
effective and robust device fingerprint that can be used for a variety of important
digital image forensic tasks, such as source device identification, device linking, and
image forgery detection. The objective of this thesis is to design effective and robust
algorithms for better fulfilling the forensic tasks based on sensor pattern noise.
We found that the non-unique periodic artifacts, typically shared amongst
cameras subjected to the same or similar in-camera processing procedures, often give
rise to false positives. These periodic artifacts manifest themselves as salient peaks
in the magnitude spectrum of reference sensor pattern noise. We propose a spectrum
equalization algorithm to detect and suppress the salient peaks in the magnitude
spectrum of reference sensor pattern noise, aiming to improve the accuracy and
reliability of source camera identification based on sensor pattern noise. We also
propose a framework for large-scale image clustering based on device fingerprints
(sensor pattern noises). The proposed clustering framework deals with large-scale
and high-dimensional device fingerprint databases and is capable of overcoming the
NC  SC problem, i.e., the number of cameras is much higher than the average
number of images acquired by each camera. Additionally, for the task of image
ix
forgery detection based on sensor pattern noise, we propose a refining algorithm to
solve the missing detection problem along the boundary area between the forged
and non-forged regions.
The proposed algorithms are evaluated on either a public benchmarking
database and our own image databases. Experimental results, as well as the com-
parisons with state-of-the-art algorithms, confirm their effectiveness and robustness.
x
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Digital Image Forensics
Advances in digital imaging technologies have led to the development of low-cost
and high-quality digital imaging devices, such as camcorders, digital cameras, scan-
ners and built-in cameras of smartphones. The ever-increasing convenience of image
acquisition has facilitated the distribution and sharing of digital images, and bred
the pervasiveness of powerful image editing tools, allowing even unskilled persons
to easily manipulate digital images for malicious or criminal ends. Under the cir-
cumstances where digital images serve as critical evidence for news photography,
scientific discovery, law enforcement, etc., maliciously manipulated images may lead
to serious consequences.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: Misleading report on Luxor massacre by the Swiss tabloid Blick in 1997.
(a) Altered image. (b) Original image.
Fig. 1.1(a) shows a image posted by the Swiss tabloid Blick after 62 tourists
(including 36 Swiss tourists) were killed in a terrorist attack at the temple of Hat-
shepsut in Luxor Egypt1. A puddle of water in the original image (Fig. 1.1(b)) was
1http://pth.izitru.com/1997_11_00.html
1
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digitally altered to appear as blood flowing from the temple. Fig. 1.2(a) shows the
American astronaut Stephen Robinson on a spacewalk in front of the Canadarm22.
Unfortunately, The Economist pointed out that the Canadian logo visible on the
arm in the image was crudely composited, because the background color and tex-
ture of the logo clearly does not match the arm. In fact, it was discovered that the
original image (Fig. 1.2(b)) without any Canadian logo was captured by NASA.
The composite image was used by several Canadian government websites to pro-
mote Canada’s involvement with the International Space Station. Tampered image
presented as evidence in the law enforcement system can be used to frame innocent
people unjustly. Kanhaiya Kumar, a student leader at India’s Jawaharlal Nehru
University, was arrested on sedition charges in the midst of a variety of contested
images and video clips which claim to show him advocating for the disintegration of
India3. One image (Fig. 1.3(a)) that circulated widely on social media shows Kumar
speaking in front of a map showing a divided India, in which portions of Kashmir
and Gujarat were annexed to Pakistan. However, in the original, undoctored image
(Fig. 1.3(b)), Kumar is actually speaking in front of a blank background.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: An example of forged images used in the scientific discovery field.
(a) A composite image used by several Canadian government websites to promote
Canada’s involvement with the International Space Station and (b) the original
image.
As can be seen in the above examples, we are now living in a world of “seeing
2http://pth.izitru.com/2014_10_00.html
3http://pth.izitru.com/2016_02_01.html
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: An example of forged images used by law enforcement. (a) A doctored
image showing Kumar speaking in front of a map of a divided India and (b) the
original image.
is not believing”. Digital images can be easily forged with increasingly powerful and
user-friendly image editing software without leaving visible traces. The increasing
appearance of digitally altered forgeries on the Internet and in mainstream media
is casting doubt on the integrity of digital images. Untrustworthy images have
challenged the public credibility, judicial impartiality, academic morality, journal-
istic integrity, etc., therefore, it is important and necessary to carry out research
on forensic technologies that can verify the originality, integrity and authenticity of
digital images.
Digital image forensics research aims at revealing underlying facts about a
suspicious image [10]. It is not limited to exposing image forgeries, as shown in the
above examples, but involves a wide range of investigations. It is intended to answer
the questions including but not limited to:
• Which device among the candidates was used to capture the image in question?
• Which images among the candidates were captured by the same source device
X?
• Is this image an original image or has it been tampered with for ulterior
motives?
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• What parts of the image has been forged and up to what extent?
• What is the processing history of the image?
1.1.1 Active Digital Image Forensics
To determine the originality, integrity and authenticity of a digital image, a straight-
forward way is to insert extra digital watermark [11–17] or signature [18–21] into
the image when it is created. The changes in the image are then detected by re-
covering and checking the embedded digital signature or watermark. For example,
Fridrich and Goljan [13] proposed two techniques to embed an image in itself both
for protecting the image content and for authentication. In [14], a semi-fragile wa-
termarking method was proposed for the automatic authentication and restoration
of the image content using irregular sampling. In spite of the effectiveness of these
active techniques, they can only be applied when the image is protected at the ori-
gin. Nowadays, the majority of images do not contain a digital watermark/signature
mainly due to the following reasons:
• Camera manufacturers have to devise extra digital watermark/signature em-
bedding components in the camera, so only some high-end cameras have wa-
termark embedding features.
• The embedded watermark/signature may degrade the image quality and sig-
nificantly reduce the market value of cameras featuring watermark/signature
embedding capability.
• The successful implementation of watermark-based protection requires close
collaborations among publishers/manufaturers, investigators and potentially
trusted third-party organizations. This limits the adoption of digital water-
mark/signature based techniques.
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1.1.2 Passive Digital Image Forensics
Compared to the above active forensic technology, passive image forensic technolo-
gies require no collaboration of users and is based on the inherent patterns in the
image itself. Most image manipulations do not leave noticeable visual artifacts, but
they do inevitably change the statistical characteristics of the manipulated image.
Passive forensic technologies verify the originality, integrity and authenticity of im-
ages through detecting the changes of statistical image characteristics. It does not
need to insert extra information in the image and there is no special requirement on
the imaging hardware. Therefore, there has been growing interest in passive forensic
techniques. Over the past few years, the research on passive image forensics mainly
has focused on the following three directions [10]:
1. Image source identification to determine the data acquisition device that gen-
erates one image. It identifies the source device at four different accuracy
levels:
• Device type: For example, is the given image generated by a camera or
a scanner?
• Device brand: For example, is the given image taken by a Canon Camera
or a Nikon camera?
• Device model: For example, is the given image taken by Canon 450D or
Canon IXUS70?
• Individual device: For example, is the give image taken by this specific
camera or another camera?
2. Discrimination of synthetic images images from real images to identify computer-
generated images which do not depict a real-life occurrence. As computer
graphics technology develops, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish
photographic images from computer-generated ones by naked eyes. There has
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been a trend of presenting synthetic images as real images or augmenting the
computer-generated virtual scenes with real scenes to deceive the viewer.
3. Image forgery detection to determine whether or not an image has undergone
any form of modification or processing after it was originally captured. It also
uncovers the parts of the given image that have been altered and up to what
extent.
As shown in Fig. 1.4, passive image forensics can be divided into three
categories based on the characteristics of the used images:
1. Passive image forensics based on natural image statistics: For example, Lyn
and Farid [22] decomposed each color channel of a color image using the sep-
arable quadrature mirror filters (QMFs) [23, 24], then calculated the mean,
variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the subband coefficient histograms at each
orientation and scale. They also considered the linear prediction errors of co-
efficient magnitudes between adjacent pixels, scales, directions and color chan-
nels. These features were input into a linear discrimination analysis (LDA) or
a nonlinear support vector machine (SVM) classifier to differentiate between
photorealistic (computer-generated) and photographic images. In [25], Khar-
razi et al. proposed 34-dimensional image features, including the mean value
of the RGB channels (3 features), the correlation pairs between RGB channels
(3 features), neighbor distribution center of mass for each of the 3 channels (3
features), RGB pairs energy ratio (3 features), wavelet domain statistics for 3
sub-bands in 3 color channels (9 features) as well as 13 image quality metrics
features, to distinguish the images taken by different cameras.
2. Passive image forensics based on traces left by specific image manipulations:
A counterfeiter has to apply one or more image manipulations to forge an
image. A specific image manipulation will leave some specific patterns in
the forged image. The techniques of this category reveal the potential image
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forgeries by looking for the traces left by specific image manipulations such as
double JPEG compression [26, 27], resampling [28, 29], contrast enhancement
[30–34], etc. It also includes the methods that detect the duplicated image
regions [35–37] or the inconsistent lighting conditions [38, 39] introduced by
copy-and-paste image forgery.
3. Passive image forensics based on consistent characteristics introduced by var-
ious imaging devices or different hardware or software processing components
in the imaging pipeline: Shown in Fig. 1.5 is the simplified imaging pipeline in
digital camera. Each processing component in the pipeline will leave specific
and consistent characteristics in the resulting image. Therefore, by detecting
the presence of the consistent characteristics introduced by imaging device, we
can trace back to the image source. Likewise, we can also uncover the image
forgery by detecting the absence of those consistent characteristics. The con-
sistent characteristics include the characteristics left by lens distortion [40],
color filter array (CFA) interpolation (or demosaicing) [28, 41], camera re-
sponse function (CRF) [41–43], JPEG artifacts [44] and sensor pattern noise
(SPN) [1, 3, 9, 45].
Passive digital image 
forensics
Based on natural image 
statistics
Based on traces left by 
specific image 
manipulations
Based on consistent   
characteristics 
introduced by imaging 
device
Figure 1.4: Passive image forensics categories.
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Figure 1.5: Simplified imaging pipeline in a typical digital camera.
1.2 Sensor Pattern Noise
As one of the most promising passive image forensic approaches, methods based on
sensor pattern noise (SPN) have attracted increasing attention in recent years. As
shown in Fig. 1.6, sensor pattern noise consists of two main components. One is
the dark signal non-uniformity (DSNU) 4 (or dark current noise as it is more com-
monly referred to as), which is the pixel-to-pixel differences when the sensor array
is not exposed to light. The dominant component in SPN is the photo response
non-uniformity (PRNU) noise, which arises primarily from the manufacturing im-
perfections and the inhomogeneity of silicon wafers during the sensor manufacturing
process. It is a powerful forensic tool due to its 1) uniqueness to individual device,
2) stability against environmental conditions and 3) robustness to some common
image processing operations. Therefore, it can be considered as the fingerprint of
imaging devices and has been widely and successfully applied in the filed of digital
image forensics. In the following subsections, source camera identification, image
clustering and image forgery detection based on SPN will be introduced.
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixed-pattern_noise#cite_note-1
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Pattern noise
DSNU PRNU
Figure 1.6: Pattern noise of imaging sensors [1].
1.2.1 Source Camera Identification Based on SPN
One challenging problem of multimedia forensics is source camera identification
(SCI). The task of SCI is to reliably match a particular digital image with its source
device. SPN is considered as the fingerprint of source camera left in every image
taken by the source camera, so it can be used for tracing back to the source device
of an image. Shown in Fig. 1.7(a) is the process of SPN-based source camera
identification. Firstly, a reference SPN is constructed for every candidate camera by
averaging the noise residues extracted from a collection of images captured by the
candidate camera. The images used for constructing the reference SPN are usually
those with high intensity and low texture, e.g., blue sky images, because the SPN is
better preserved in them. To determine the source camera that has taken a query
image among all candidate cameras, the noise residue of the query image (or query
SPN) is extracted and compared with the reference SPN. If the highest similarity
is higher than a predefined threshold, the query image is deemed to be taken by
the camera with the highest similarity. Another forensic scenario is shown in Fig.
1.7(b), where SPN is used for identifying the image among candidate images taken
by a camera. Compared to the first scenario, it is the same in essence while differing
9
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1.7: Use of SPN in source camera identification. (a) Identifying the source
camera of a given image among candidate cameras and (b) Identifying the images
taken by a camera among candidate images.
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in minor points. In this scenario, as long as the similarity between the query SPN
and the reference SPN is high enough, the query image is considered to be captured
by the camera.
1.2.2 Image Clustering Based on SPN
In the above application of SPN in source camera identification, a set of images taken
by the same camera are required for the construction of the reference SPN. This
requirement can be easily fulfilled when the camera is available to the investigators.
However, in many real-world scenarios, only a set of images are available, but with-
out any information about the source cameras. In such circumstances, sometimes
it is still desirable to be able to cluster the images into a number of groups, each
including the images acquired by the same camera. Take Internet child pornography
for example, lots of illegal images can be confiscated from pornographic website, but
the cameras which have taken these images are not available to the forensic investi-
gators. If we can cluster these images into a number of groups, each including the
images acquired by the same camera, we are able to associate different crime scenes
and would be in a better position to link the evidence to the seized hardwares that
are owned by the suspects in the future. As shown in Fig. 1.8, this task can be
accomplished by resorting to the use of SPNs extracted from the images. By clus-
tering the SPNs, the corresponding images taken by the same camera are grouped
into the same group.
1.2.3 Image Forgery Detection Based on SPN
Sensor pattern noise (SPN) can be considered as a spread-spectrum watermark
embedded in every image taken by the source imaging device. Therefore, it can also
be used for localizing the forgeries in digital images. However, since SPN, by its
very nature, is a very weak noise-like signal, its reliable detection requires jointly
processing a large number of pixel samples, e.g., in a block-wise manner. As shown
11
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Figure 1.8: Use of SPN in image clustering.
in Fig. 1.9, the SPN extracted from the image in question is compared with the
reference SPN in a block-wise manner. If their similarity (usually normalized cross
correlation), which serves as a decision statistic, is below a pre-determined threshold
(e.g., by Neyman-Pearson criterion), the center pixel in the block is declared as
forged. This method exposes the image forgery by detecting the absence of SPN
irrespective of the specific type of forgery, it therefore arouses wide attention of the
researchers in the field of digital forensics.
1.3 Main Contributions
Digital image forensics is a broad area and includes research spanning a range of
directions. In this thesis, our research on digital image forensics is narrowed down
to the applications of sensor pattern noise in source camera identification, image
12
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Figure 1.9: Use of SPN in digital image forgery detection.
clustering and image forgery detection. The major contributions we have made are
summarized in detail as follows.
1. Although SPN has been proven to be an effective means to uniquely iden-
tify digital cameras, some non-unique artifacts, shared amongst cameras sub-
jected to the same or similar in-camera processing procedures, often give rise
to false identifications. We propose a novel preprocessing approach, i.e., spec-
trum equalization algorithm (SEA) in Chapter 3, that equalizes the magnitude
spectrum of the reference SPN through detecting and suppressing the peaks
according to the local characteristics. It aims at removing the interfering pe-
riodic artifacts and therefore reduces the false identification rate.
2. The challenges of clustering large-scale camera fingerprints come from the
large-scale and high-dimensional nature of the problem. The difficulties can
be further aggravated when the number of classes is much higher than the av-
eraged class size, which is not uncommon in many practical scenarios. We
propose an efficient clustering framework for large-scale device fingerprint
database in Chapter 4. The framework works in an iterative way and uti-
lizes both the dimension reduction technology and divide&conquer strategy
to reduce the time and space complexity. The proposed framework can be
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easily parallelized and adapted to very large-scale camera fingerprints cluster-
ing tasks.
3. As demonstrated in Fig. 1.9, the reliable detection of SPN for exposing image
forgery requires the algorithm to work in block-wise manner. However, when
the detection block falls near the boundary of the tampered and the non-
tampered regions, the decision statistic becomes a weighted average of two
different contributions and may lead to a high false acceptance rate (FAR)
(i.e., misidentifying a tampered block as non-tampered). We propose a re-
fining algorithm to alleviate the missing detection problem in Chapter 5. We
model how the decision statistic changes as the detection block is placed across
the boundary of two different regions (i.e., tampered and non-tampered) and
adjust the decision threshold accordingly to achieve a more satisfactory detec-
tion.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
This chapter briefly introduces the background of digital image forensics and how
sensor pattern noise can be used for identifying source camera, clustering images
and exposing image forgeries. The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 first categories the interferences introduced in the imaging pipeline
that affect the quality of the estimated SPN and introduces the approaches that
aim at alleviating or eliminating the effect of the interferences to improve the per-
formance of SPN based source camera identification. It then revisits the related
work on image clustering based on camera fingerprint and points out the challenges
of clustering large-scale image databases that have not yet been addressed by the
existing methods. Literature on SPN based image forgery detection will also be
reviewed in the last section of this chapter.
Chapter 3 starts with a case study to investigate the limitations of existing
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SPN preprocessing schemes. It then presents the details of a novel preprocessing
scheme, spectrum equalization algorithm (SEA), that overcomes the limitations of
existing approaches. Combined with 6 state-of-the-art SPN extraction methods, the
proposed preprocessing scheme is evaluated with comprehensive experimental results
and analysis on the Dresden image database for both the general and special cases.
Finally, it also gives the comparison of running times among different preprocessing
schemes and similarity measurements.
Chapter 4 introduces our proposed clustering framework for large-scale cam-
era fingerprint databases step by step, including data preparation, coarse clustering,
fine clustering, centroid attraction and post processing. It also discusses the param-
eter selection and time complexity. Finally, it validates the capability of clustering
large-scale databases and the advantage of the proposed framework over other state-
of-the-art clustering algorithms with extensive experimental results.
Chapter 5 first introduces the missing detection problem of SPN based image
forgery detection along the boundary between the forged and non-forged areas. It
then models the correlation distribution in the problematic area and proposes to
adjust the threshold accordingly to alleviate the missing detection problem. In this
chapter, the effectiveness of the algorithm is verified via three realistic image forgery
detection examples.
Chapter 6 summarizes this thesis. Several key challenges we are confronted
with and some possible future research directions will be also given in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
2.1 Source Camera Identification
Sensor Pattern Noise (SPN) has attracted much attention from researchers in the
area of digital forensics since it was proven to be an effective and robust device
fingerprint in [1]. One of the important applications of SPN is source camera iden-
tification (SCI), which is about identifying the source camera of a given image from
candidate cameras. The typical process of using SPN for SCI is as follows. A refer-
ence SPN R is first constructed by averaging the noise residual Wi extracted from
the ith image of the N images taken by the same camera:
R =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Wi. (2.1)
The similarity between the reference SPN R and the query noise residue W is
measured by the normalized correlation coefficient (NCC) ρ:
ρ(R,W) =
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1(W [i, j]−W )(R[i, j]−R)
‖W −W‖ · ‖R−R‖ , (2.2)
where ‖ · ‖ is the L2 norm, R and W are of the same size m × n, and R and W
are the arithmetic mean of R and W, respectively. Suppose the reference SPN of
camera c is Rc, the task of SCI is then achieved by identifying camera c
∗ with the
maximal NCC value that is greater than a predefined threshold τρ as the source
device of the query image, i.e.,
c∗ = argmax
c∈C
ρ(Rc,W), ρ(Rc∗ ,W) > τρ, (2.3)
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where C is the set of candidate cameras.
However, the correlation-based detection of SPN heavily relies upon the qual-
ity of the extracted SPN, which can be severely contaminated by different interfer-
ences. In the following subsections, the interferences that may degrade the quality
of SPN and the approaches used to alleviate or eliminate the interferences will be
discussed.
2.1.1 Scene Details
SPN is a weak noise-like signal, so its estimation is usually based on the the noise
residual W, where the image content is significantly suppressed. The noise residual
W of an image I is formulated as
W = I− F (I), (2.4)
where F (·) is a denoising filter. The widely used denoising filter for SPN extraction
is the wavelet-based technique proposed by Mihcak et al. [2]. As described in [1], it
works as follows
1. Calculate the four-level wavelet decomposition of the noisy image with the 8-
tap Daubechies QMF. Denote the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal subbands
as h[i, j], v[i, j] and d[i, j], where [i, j] runs through an index set J that depends
on the decomposition level. We only show the operations for h[i, j] in the
following two steps, because the operations on v[i, j] and d[i, j] are exactly the
same.
2. Estimate the local variance of the original noise-free image for each wavelet
coefficient using the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation for four sizes of
17
2.1 Source Camera Identification
a square w × w neighborhood Nw, i.e.,
σˆ2[i, j] = min
w∈{3,5,7,9}
[
max
(
0,
1
w2
∑
[k,l]∈Nw
h2[k, l]− σ20
)]
, (2.5)
where σ20 is the overall variance of additive Gaussian white noise to be removed
and is usually set to 4 or 9 for high-quality images.
3. The denoised wavelet coefficients are obtained suing the Wiener filter
hˆ[i, j] = h[i, j]
σˆ2[i, j]
σˆ2[i, j] + σ20
. (2.6)
4. Repeat above 3 steps for each level and apply the inverse wavelet transform
to the denoised wavelet coefficients to obtain the denoised image.
Shown in Fig. 2.1(a) and Fig. 2.1(b) are an image of natural scene and the
noise residual extracted with the Mihcak denoising filter [1, 2]. As can be seen, the
noise residual contains strong scene details, especially in the edge areas, because
scene details account for part of the components of I and their magnitude is far
greater than that of SPN [3].
Many efforts have been devoted to suppressing scene details in the noise
residual to obtain SPN of higher quality. In [3], Li proposed 5 models to attenuate
scene detail by assigning less significant weighting factors to the strong components
of SPN in the Digital Wavelet Transform (DWT) domain. The underlying rationale
is based on the hypothesis that the stronger a signal component in noise residual
W is, the more likely that it is associated with strong scene details, and thus the
less trustworthy the component should be. The enhanced noise residual of the image
(Fig. 2.1(a)) is shown in Fig. 2.1(c), where the magnitudes of strong edges have
been suppressed.
As mentioned in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, the dominant component in SPN
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.1: (a) A natural image, (b) noise residual obtained with the Mihcak de-
noising filter [1, 2], and (c) noise residual enhanced using Model 3 with parameter
6 proposed in [3]. Note that the noise residual is extracted only from the green
channel.
is the PRNU noise. So in [9], noise residual W is modeled as
W = IK + Ξ, (2.7)
where I is the observed image, K is the zero-mean like multiplicative factor responsi-
ble for PRNU, and Ξ stands for other noises including the interferences from image
content, dark current noise, shot noise, and the errors introduced by the denoising
filter. Equation (2.7) indicates that to obtain better estimation of SPN, the lumi-
nance I should be as high as possible but not saturated because saturated pixels
carry no information about the PRNU factor [9]. Another observation in Equation
(2.7) is that high variation in Ξ introduces strong interference to IK. Therefore,
SPN is better preserved in smooth areas (i.e., with lower variance). Based on the
two insights that stems from Equation (2.7), some works improve the performance
of source camera identification by taking into consideration pixel intensity and spa-
tial variation. For example, a weighting scheme based on the image gradient was
proposed in [46]. The weight w(p) for each pixel p is calculated as
w(p) = G(σ) ∗ 1
1 + ‖∇Ip‖ , (2.8)
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where G(σ) is a Gaussian kernel and ∇ denotes the gradient operator. While in
[47], both the image intensities and image textures were considered. The authors
classified the image pixels into four classes:
• Class 1: Low brightness, Low texture
• Class 2: Medium brightness, High texture
• Class 3: High brightness, Low texture
• Class 4: Saturated brightness, Medium texture.
They found that Class 3 is the best class in the sense of increasing the intra-
camera similarities and decreasing the inter-camera similarities. A more sophisti-
cated weighting scheme that formulates the relationship between the image features
(related with image intensity and texture) and the correlation values was proposed
in [48]. The image features are defined as

fbi =
1
|Bb|
∑
i∈Bb
Ip
fbt =
1
|Bb|
∑
i∈Bb
1
1 + var3(Ip)
,
(2.9)
where Bb is the image block, |Bb| is the cardinality of Bb, Ip is the intensity of
the image at pixel p, and var3(Ip) is the variance of Ip in a 3 × 3 neighborhood.
The 2-dimensional features are extracted from each of the M 128×128-pixel image
blocks cropped from a set of training images (100 training images for each camera
were used in [48]). Then the kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) [49] was
used to predict the correlations ρ between the reference SPN and the SPN extracted
from training blocks:
ρˆ = Hθ, (2.10)
where H consists of the principal components of Φ(X), which defines the non-linear
transform from the original feature space X to a higher dimensional space. H can
20
2.1 Source Camera Identification
be considered as the projected data of X via KPCA, and θ can be estimated by
applying the lease square estimator (LSE)
θ =
(
HTH
)−1
HTρ. (2.11)
A low predicted correlation ρˆ means a large amount of image content is left in the
noise residue. On the other hand, a large predicted correlation means that the
region does not suffer from image content effect. Hence, the predicted correlation
can be used to weight the center pixel of the extracted SPN [48]. While all the
afore-mentioned schemes aim at weighting the query SPN, a weighted averaging
scheme [50] was proposed for the estimation of the reference SPN. Specifically, the
equal weighting factor 1/N in Equation (2.1) is replaced with
wi =
1
σ2i
( N∑
m=1
1
σ2m
)−1
, i = 1, ..., N, (2.12)
where σ2i is the variance of undesirable noise, i.e.,
σ2i =
∑L
j=1 (ni[j]− ni)2
L
ni = Wi −W
ni =
∑L
j=1 ni[j]
L
W =
∑N
i=1 Wi
N
.
(2.13)
Note that L is the length of samples (i.e., the image size). As reported in [50], sig-
nificant performance improvements can be achieved by adopting this new weighting
scheme.
Since the denoising filter F (·) in Equation (2.4) plays a key role in preventing
the scene details from propagating to W, a straightforward idea is to use more
advanced denoising filters. Chierchia et al. used a more effective denoising filter,
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.2: (a) A natural image, (b) noise residual obtained with the Mihcak de-
noising filter [1, 2], (c) noise residual obtained with PCAI8 [4], and noise residual
extracted with the BM3D denoising filter [5]. Note that we only show the noise
residual extracted from the green channel, because there is no much difference for
the red and blue channels.
i.e., block matching and 3D filtering (BM3D), to obtained the noise residual from
images [5] BM3D works by grouping 2D image patches with similar structures into
3D arrays and collectively filtering the grouped image blocks. The sparseness of the
representation due to the similarity between the grouped blocks makes it capable of
better separating the true signal and noise. Compared to the noise residual obtained
with the Mihcak filter [2] (Fig. 2.2(b)), most of the image content-related structures
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are removed in the noise residual obtained with BM3D [5]. Wu et al. [51] proposed
another SPN extractor, edge adaptive SPN predictor based on context adaptive
interpolation (PCAI), to suppress the effect of scenes and edges. Suppose Ip is the
pixel value to be predicted at pixel p, then the predicted pixel value is formulated
as
Iˆ(p) =

mean(t), (max(t)−min(t) ≤ 20)
(n+ s)/2, (|e− w| − |n− s| > 20)
(e+ w)/2, (|n− s| − |e− w| > 20)
median(t), (otherwise),
(2.14)
where t = [n, s, e, w]T is the four-neighboring pixels of p, as shown in Fig. 2.3.
An extension of this method is to make use of all the eight neighboring pixels
t′ = [n, s, e, w, en, es, wn,ws]T, as proposed in [4], where Iˆ(p) is formulated as
Iˆ(p) =

mean(t′), (max(t′)−min(t′) ≤ 20)
(n+ s)/2, (|e− w| − |n− s| > 20)
(e+ w)/2, (|n− s| − |e− w| > 20)
(es+ wn)/2, (|en− ws| − |es− wn| > 20)
(en+ ws)/2, (|es− wn| − |en− ws| > 20)
median(t′), (otherwise).
(2.15)
Finally, a pixel-wise Wiener filter will be performed on the difference between the
original and the predicted image, D = I− Iˆ, to obtain the noise residual
W [i, j] = D[i, j]
σ20
σˆ2[i, j] + σ20
, (2.16)
where
σˆ2[i, j] = max
(
0,
1
w2
∑
[k,l]∈Nw
D2[k, l]− σ20
)
. (2.17)
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Figure 2.3: Neighborhood of the center pixel to be predicted. This figure is excerpted
from [4].
σ20 and w have the same meanings as in Eq. 2.5. In both [51] and [4], the size w of the
local neighborhood and σ20 are set to 3 and 9, respectively. Throughout this thesis,
the method in [4] will be referred to as PCAI8 and used to represent this line of
work. The noise residual extracted with PCAI8 is shown in Fig. 2.2(d). Surprisingly,
although PCAI8 was declared to have better performance than the Mihcak filter and
BM3D in [4], the scene details are more pronounced in Fig. 2.2(d).
2.1.2 Demosaicing
In digital cameras, the imaging sensor is probably the most expensive component.
Therefore, to reduce the costs and increase the sales, most consumer digital cameras
are equipped with only one sensor and an associated color filter array (CFA) to
capture all necessary colors at the same time. Fig. 2.4 shows the simplified imaging
pipeline, where the most widely used Bayer CFA is placed on top of a CCD sensor.
For each pixel, only one color component passes through the CFA and consequently
forms a monochrome image. To recover the full-color image from the mosaic-like
monochrome image captured by the sensor, a demosaicing, or CFA interpolation,
process needs to be devised to estimate the missing color components. However,
the estimated color components are not directly acquired by physical hardware and
carry interpolation noises. We expect that the PRNU extracted from the physical
components, which are free from interpolation noise, should be more reliable than
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that from the artificial channels, which carry interpolation noise. Therefore, it is
expected that the SPN extracted from the “physical” components, which are free
from interpolation noise, should be more reliable than that from the “artificial”
components.
CFA + CCD
Dem
osaicking
Lens Postprocessing
Scene
Figure 2.4: Simplified imaging pipeline of a typical digital camera.
To address this issue, Li and Li proposed a Color-Decoupled PRNU (CD-
PRNU) extraction method in [6], which first decomposes each color channel into 4
sub-images and then extracts the PRNU noise from each sub-image. The PRNU
noise patterns of the sub-images are then assembled to get the CD-PRNU. Fig.
2.5 shows the noise residual extraction process for the red color channel, similarly
for the green and the blue channels. This method can prevent the interpolation
noise from propagating into the physical components, thus improving the accuracy
of device identification and image content integrity verification [6]. In [7], Hu et
al. proposed to exploit the CFA structure to make better use of the information
from all the 3 color channels. The process is depicted in Fig. 2.6: First, the large
components in the noise residual of each color channel are selected based on their
work in [52] (the first column of Fig. 2.6). Second, only the physical components
(i.e., the components that are not in the interpolated positions) are kept, as shown
in the second column of Fig. 2.6. Finally, the remaining components in 3 color
channels are combined to acquire the camera fingerprint (the last column of Fig.
2.6). However, the CFA structure is usually unknown in practice, so they compared
each component in the second column of Fig. 2.6 with its counterparts at the same
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Figure 2.5: The color-decoupled noise residual extraction process for the red channel.
This figure is excerpted from [6].
position on other color channels. If it is the largest component, then it is kept,
otherwise it is set to 0. Taking the green channel as an example, for all pixels on
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W˜g,
W˜g =

W˜g, if g = argmax
x∈{r,g,b}
|W˜x|
0, otherwise.
(2.18)
In this way, the impact of demosaicing on the extracted noise residual has
been reduced.
Wr
Wg
Wb W˜b
W˜g
W˜r
W
Figure 2.6: The construction of SPN using information from 3 color channels. Block
with @ refers to the pixel with large magnitude. This figure is excerpted from [7].
2.1.3 Periodic Artifacts
For the task of source camera identification, some periodic artifacts, shared amongst
cameras subjected to the same or similar periodic in-camera processing procedures,
are not unique to the sensor. The SPN estimated from two different cameras may
thus be slightly correlated, which would give rise to false positives and decrease the
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reliability of identification system. Non-unique periodic artifacts can be summarized
as follows:
• CFA interpolation artifacts: A typical CFA interpolation is accomplished
by estimating the missing components from spatially adjacent pixels according
to the component-location information indicated by a specific CFA pattern.
As CFA patterns form a periodic structure, measurable offset gains will result
in periodic biases in the interpolated image [9]. The periodic biases manifest
themselves as peaks in the DFT spectrum, and the locations of the peaks
depend on the configuration of the CFA pattern.
• JPEG blocky artifacts: In JPEG compression, non-overlapping 8× 8-pixel
blocks are coded with DCT independently. So high JPEG compression causes
blocky artifacts, which manifest themselves in the DFT spectrum as peaks in
the positions (U8 u,
V
8 v), where U and V are the sizes of the spectrum, and
u, v ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}.
• Diagonal artifacts: As reported in [53], unexpected diagonal artifacts were
observed for the reference SPN of Nikon CoolPixS710. Although the cause is
yet to be investigated, the artifacts are reflected in the spectrum as peaks in
the positions corresponding to the row and column period introduced by the
diagonal artifacts.
Some works have been proposed to suppress these periodic artifacts. Chen et
al. preprocessed the reference SPN R by zero-meaning (ZM) operation and Wiener
filtering (WF) in the DFT domain in [9]. In the zero-meaning operation, column
averages of R are subtracted from each pixel in each column and then row averages
are subtracted from every pixel in the row to obtain the zero-meaned signal Rzm. In
the subsequent WF operation, Rzm is further processed in the DFT domain using
a Wiener filter:
Rwf = Real
(
F−1(D · |D| −W(|D|, σ2)|D| )), (2.19)
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where Real(·) returns the real part of input, F(·) is the DFT, W(·) is the Wiener
Filter, D = F(Rzm), |D| is the magnitude of D, and σ2 = 1MN
∑
i,j Rzm[i, j]. In [45],
Kang et al. only kept the phase component of the noise residual and constructed a
reference phase SPN to enhance the performance of SCI:
Rph = Real
(
F−1(∑Ni=1 Wφi
N
))
, (2.20)
where F−1(·) is the inverse DFT and Wφi is phase-only component of noise residual
Wi, i.e.,
Wφi =
F(Wi)
|F(Wi)| , i = 1, 2, ..., N. (2.21)
The underlying rationale is that the SPN (noise residue) is usually modeled as an
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) in its extraction process, it is reasonable
to assume the camera reference SPN to be a white noise signal with flat frequency
spectrum to remove the impact of the contamination in the frequency domain [45].
Only keeping the phase components whitens the noise residual in the frequency
domain and helps to remove the periodic artifacts.
The above-mentioned methods are claimed to be effective in suppressing the
periodic artifacts. We conducted experiments on one Olympus Mju 1050SW, which
suffers severely from the periodic artifacts, to see their performances on suppress-
ing the unwanted periodic artifacts. 50 flat field (i.e., intensities are approximately
constant) images were used for estimating the reference SPN. The size of reference
SPN is 256 × 256 pixels and each noise residual used for reference estimation was
extracted from the green channel using the Mihcak denoising filter [1]. The logarith-
mic magnitude spectrum of R, Rzm, Rwf, and Rph are shown in Fig. 2.7(a)-2.7(d).
As can be seen, compared to R, the DC components of Rzm are completely removed,
and Rwf and Rph are significantly whitened. However, the “white” points (peaks) in
the spectrum, which are related with the periodic artifacts, are clearly shown in the
processed reference SPN. This leaves space for improvement and will be discussed
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.7: The logarithmic magnitude spectra of (a) R, (b) Rzm, (c) Rwf, and Rph.
in depth in Chapter 3.
Another set of approaches attempts to suppress the periodic artifacts through
the use of more sophisticated detection statistics or similarity measurements. Gol-
jan [54] proposed the peak-to-correlation energy (PCE) measure to attenuate the
influence of periodic noise contaminations
PCE(R,W) =
C2RW[0, 0]
1
MN−|A|
∑
[k,l]/∈AC
2
RW[k, l]
, (2.22)
where R and W are of the same size M×N , CRW is the 2D circular cross correlation
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between R and W, A is a small area around (0, 0), and |A| is the cardinality of
the area. Later in [45], Kang et al. proposed to use the correlation over circular
cross-correlation norm (CCN) to further decrease the false-positive rate:
CCN(R,W) =
CRW[0, 0]√
1
MN−|A|
∑
[k,l]/∈AC
2
RW[k, l]
, (2.23)
where all the symbols have the same meanings as in Equation (2.22). Actually CCN
shares the same essence as the signed PCE (SPCE) [55, 56]
SPCE(R,W) =
sign(CRW[0, 0])C
2
RW[0, 0]
1
MN−|A|
∑
[k,l]/∈AC
2
RW[k, l]
, (2.24)
where sign(·) is the sign function, and all the other symbols have the same meanings
as in Equation (2.22). Note that the above-mentioned approaches can be combined
for additional performance gains. For instance, one can apply ZM and WF opera-
tions on the reference SPN extracted with BM3D or PCAI algorithm, and enhance
the query noise residual with the help of Li’s models [3], and finally choose SPCE
or CCN as the similarity measurement to identify the source camera.
2.2 Image Clustering Based on SPN
As described in the last section, to determine the origin of a given image among
candidate cameras, a reference SPN is constructed for each candidate camera by
averaging the noise residues extracted from a set of images taken by the camera.
The given image is deemed to be taken by the camera associated with the detected
SPN in the image. In this case, a set of images taken by the same camera are
required for the construction of the reference SPN. This requirement can be easily
fulfilled when the camera is available to the investigators. However, in many real-
world scenarios, only a set of images are available, but without any information
about the source cameras. Taking child pornography as an example, illegal images
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are confiscated from pornographic websites, but the cameras which have been used
to take these images are not available to the forensic investigators. In some forensic
circumstances, it is necessary to cluster the images into a number of groups, each
including the images acquired by the same camera, so that the forensic investigators
are able to associate different crime scenes and would be in a better position to link
the evidence to the seized hardwares that are owned by the suspects. This task
can be accomplished by clustering the images based on the SPNs extracted from
the images. While several methods have been proposed for clustering the camera
fingerprints, their applicability is restricted to small datasets mainly due to the
large-scale and high-dimensional nature of the problem.
2.2.1 Markov Random Field Based Method
One of the first works dedicated to clustering camera fingerprints into a number of
classes was reported in [57], where each enhanced fingerprint is treated as a random
variable and Markov random field (MRF) is used to iteratively update the class
label of each fingerprint. A subset of images are randomly chosen from the entire
dataset to set up a training set and a pairwise similarity matrix is calculated for
the training set, based on which a reference similarity is determined using the k-
means (k = 2) clustering algorithm and a membership committee consisting of a
certain number of the most similar fingerprints is formed for each fingerprint. The
similarity values and class labels within the membership committee are used to
estimate the likelihood probability of assigning each class label to the corresponding
fingerprint. Then the class label with the highest probability in its membership
committee is assigned to the fingerprint in question. The clustering stops when
there are no label changes after two consecutive iterations. Finally, each fingerprint
in the rest of the dataset is classified to its closest cluster. This algorithm performs
well on small datasets, but it is very slow due to the calculation of the likelihood
probability, which involves all the members in the membership committee and needs
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to be calculated for every class label and every fingerprint. The time complexity is
nearly O(n3) in the first iteration, where n is the number fingerprints, so it becomes
obviously computationally prohibitive for large-scale datasets. Another limitation is
that when there are many classes in the dataset, the size of the training set has to be
large enough to ensure that all of the classes are present in the training set. These
two limitations make it computationally infeasible even for medium-sized datasets.
2.2.2 Graph Clustering Based Method
In [58], camera fingerprints clustering is formulated as a weighted undirected graph
partitioning problem. Each fingerprint is considered as a vertex in the graph, while
the weight of each edge is represented by the similarity between the two fingerprints
linked by the edge. To avoid the time-consuming pairwise similarity calculation,
a sparse graph is constructed instead. A vertex is randomly selected as the initial
center of the graph and the weights of its edges with all other vertices are calculated.
The (κ+1)th closest vertex to the first center is then selected as the second center and
its edge weights with all other vertices except the first center are calculated, where
κ is a parameter controlling the sparsity of the graph. The construction procedure
stops when the number of vertices that have not been considered as a center is not
larger than κ. A multi-class spectral clustering algorithm [59] is then employed on
the constructed graph to partition the vertices (fingerprints) into a number of clus-
ters. For every vertex being investigated, its similarities with all the other vertices
have to be calculated when constructing the sparse graph. It is fine if all fingerprints
can be fit into the memory at a time, but when it comes to large-scale datasets, the
algorithm becomes inefficient due to the high I/O overhead because one fingerprint
may need to be read from the disk many times for calculating its similarities with
the centers. The time complexity of the algorithm in [59] is O(n 32m+ nm2), where
m is the number of partitions. It is thus faster than Li’s algorithm [57]. However,
to determine the optimal number of partitions, the algorithm works in an iterative
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manner until the size of the smallest cluster equals 1. Putting aside the speed, the
aptness of the manner of finding the optimal partitions number is still an issue for
large-scale camera fingerprint datasets.
2.2.3 Hierarchical Clustering Based Method
Another algorithm based on the hierarchical clustering was proposed in [60]. Similar
to [57], the fingerprint is enhanced beforehand and only a random subset (training
set) of the whole dataset is used for clustering, followed by a classification stage
for the remaining fingerprints. Initially considering each fingerprint as one cluster,
the algorithm first calculates the pairwise similarity matrix of the training set. The
two most similar clusters are merged into one and the similarity matrix is updated
by replacing the corresponding two rows and columns with the similarities between
the merged cluster and all other clusters. After the update, a silhouette coefficient,
which measures the separation among clusters and the cohesion within each cluster,
is calculated for each fingerprint. A global measure of the silhouette coefficients is
calculated by taking the average value of the silhouette coefficients, and stored with
the current partition. When all fingerprints have been merged into a cluster, the
partition corresponding to the lowest silhouette coefficient is the optimal clustering.
In the end, the classification stage is the same as what has been described in [57].
Another similar hierarchical clustering based algorithm was proposed in [61], where
the only difference is that the calculation of the silhouette coefficient is performed for
each cluster rather than for each fingerprint and only the separation to the nearest
neighboring cluster is measured. As reported in [60], with comparable accuracy, the
hierarchical clustering based algorithm is faster than [57]. But the computational
cost of the hierarchical clustering is still very high and requires at least O(n2 log n)
operations. This therefore limits its applicability to large-scale databases.
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2.2.4 Other Clustering Methods
There are many other algorithms that have been proposed for clustering various
types of data. However, the challenges of clustering large-scale camera fingerprints
come from the large-scale and high-dimensional nature of the problem. The difficul-
ties can be further aggravated when the Number of Classes (i.e., number of cameras)
is much higher than the average Size of Class (i.e., number of images acquired by
each camera). We refer to this as the NC  SC problem, which is not uncommon
in many practical scenarios. The NC  SC problem makes it difficult, if not im-
possible, to form a training set at random that can sufficiently represent the entire
population. The characteristics of the camera fingerprints clustering problem also
make it difficult to employ most of the classic clustering algorithms. For example,
the partition clustering algorithms, as typified by K-means [62] and CLARANS
[63], require users to provide the desired partition number K, the determination
of which can be tricky in practice. Moreover, they may require several passes over
the database and thus do not scale well to large-scale camera fingerprint databases.
The density based approaches, such as DBSCAN [64], are directly performed on
the entire database. As a result, for large databases that cannot fit in the main
memory, it could incur substantial I/O cost [65]. Furthermore, its sensitiveness to
parameters and its inability to handle clusters with various densities make it hard
to produce satisfactory results on camera fingerprints, whose noise-like characteris-
tics can easily result in clusters with various densities. Some hierarchical clustering
algorithms using random sampling to reduce the input size for large databases, such
as [65] and [66], will suffer from the NC  SC problem. Other hierarchical clus-
tering algorithms designed for large-scale databases, as typified by BIRCH [67] and
CHAMELEON [68], do not perform well on camera fingerprint databases because of
either the sensitivity to outliers or the high I/O cost when constructing the κ-nearest
graph.
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2.3 Forgery Detection
Detecting image forgeries is an interesting while very challenging task due to the
variety of image manipulations a user can perform with increasingly powerful image
editing software. Active techniques, such as digital watermarking, are effective in
verifying the content of an image, but the requirement of originally embedding
into the protected image limits their widespread use in practice. Therefore, there
has been growing interest in passive techniques for image forgery detection. Many
passive image forgery detection techniques are designed for detecting one specific
form of image altering operations, such as contrast enhancement [31, 33, 34, 69] and
copy-move forgery [35, 70, 71], however, in most scenarios, the forensic investigators
do not have any prior information of the suspicious images and have to apply a large
set of forensic methods on the suspect images before making the final decisions.
Sensor pattern noise (SPN) can be considered as an intrinsic watermark embedded
in every image taken by the source device and therefore appears as a promising tool
for detecting image forgeries. When the camera reference SPN is available, image
forgeries can be exposed by detecting the absence of the SPN in targeted regions
irrespective of the specific type of forgery. Another merit of SPN is that it is robust
to some common image processing operations, such as JPEG compression, filtering,
or gamma correction [1, 9]. These two merits make SPN very attractive in many
practical applications.
2.3.1 Preliminary Method
To the best of our knowledge, the first work that uses SPN for image forgery detec-
tion was proposed in [8], where two different approaches were devised for verifying
the integrity of a selected Region of Interest (ROI) and for automatically identifying
forged areas. Specifically, the first approach aims to verify the integrity of a selected
area Ω in an image I. Firstly, a reference SPN R is constructed as in Equation
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(2.1) for the source camera C that has taken I. To calculate the statistical evidence
that Ω has been tampered with, a large set of image regions Qk, k = 1, ..., N of the
same size and shape is collected either from the images taken by the same camera
C (but a different location within the images), or from the images taken by other
cameras. These image regions can be considered as “tampered” regions, and the
correlations ρ(RΩ,Wk), k = 1, ..., N are used to estimate a generalized Gaussian
distribution, where RΩ is the reference SPN in the position of Ω and Wk is the
SPN (i.e., noise residual) extracted from Qk. Using the correlation distribution
estimated from “tampered” regions, the probability that a generalized Gaussian
random variable will attain the value ρ(RΩ,WΩ) or larger is
p = 1−G(ρ(RΩ,WΩ)), (2.25)
where WΩ is the SPN in Ω and G(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the
estimated generalized Gaussian distribution. Ω has been forged if p > α = 10−3,
and not forged otherwise.
The second approach is capable of automatically identifying the forged area.
To detect forgeries of different shapes, twelve sliding blocks of different shapes and
sizes are prepared, as illustrated in Fig. 2.8. These blocks will be moved across
the entire image and the correlation at each location will be calculated for decision-
making. The details of the algorithm are given as follows [8]:
1. For each block type i ∈ {1, ..., N} illustrated in Fig. 2.8, compute the correla-
tion of the noise residual with the reference SPN in the sliding block moving
across the entire image (overlapping approximately 50% − 75%). This will
generate a number of correlations ρj , j = 1, ..., ni, where ni is the number of
correlations calculated for each block type i.
2. For each block type i, select m blocks {i1, ..., im} with the smallest correlations
ρk, k = 1, ...,m. There will be a total of m×N blocks Bk.
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3. Construct the mask B =
⋃m×N
k=1 Bk.
4. For each pixel q ∈ B, let t(q) = |{Bk|q ∈ Bk}| be the number of blocks
selected in Step 2 covering q.
5. The potentially forged region is R = {q|t(q) > t}, where t is the median value
of t(q) for q ∈ B.
The detected area output by the second approach can be further verified as in the
first approach for detection forgeries in user-selected ROIs.
Figure 2.8: Sliding block shapes used for automatic ROI detection. This figure is
excerpted from [8].
2.3.2 Constant False Acceptance Rate Method
The work in [8] was formally modeled and improved by Chen et al. in [9]. They
modeled the SPN detection problem as a binary hypothesis testing problem:

H0 : W = Ξ,
H1 : W = R + Ξ,
(2.26)
where W is the noise residual extracted from the image region in question, R is
the reference SPN (camera fingerprint), and Ξ is the combination of other indepen-
dent interferences. The forgery detection at each pixel is therefore formulated as
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a hypothesis testing problem applied to a block surrounding the pixel. But before
doing that both the correlation distribution under hypothesis H0, p(x|H0), and the
correlation distribution under hypothesis H1, p(x|H1) need to be estimated.
p(x|H0) can be estimated using the method described in Section 2.3.1, while
the estimation of p(x|H1) is difficult, because the correlation heavily depends on
image content and is most likely to be over-fitting to the available images. Therefore,
instead of explicitly estimating p(x|H1), a correlation predictor is constructed as a
mapping from the image feature space to the predicted correlation value. K image
blocks of 128 × 128 pixels are cropped from several images taken by the source
camera. These blocks may be overlapped with each other, so that one can extract
sufficient image blocks from one image. Four image features are extracted from
each image block: Image intensity feature fI , texture feature fT , signal flattening
feature fS , and texture-intensity feature fE . Let ρ be the correlations between the
noise residuals of the K image blocks and the reference SPN in the corresponding
positions, and f I , fT , fS , and fE be the corresponding K-dimensional feature
vectors. ρ is modeled as a linear combination of the features and their second-order
terms
ρ[k] = θ0 + θ1fI [k] + θ2fT [k] + θ3fS [k] + θ4fE [k]+
θ5fI [k]fI [k] + ...+ θ14fE [k]fE [k] + Ψ[k], (2.27)
where Ψ[k] is the modeling noise and θ is the coefficients to be determined. Equation
(2.27) can be rewritten into a matrix form θ = Hθ+Ψ, where H is a K×15 matrix
of features and their multiplications. By applying the least square estimator (LSE),
we can obtain the estimated parameters
θˆ =
(
HTH
)−1
HTρ. (2.28)
Given an image block, its expected correlation ρˆ can be predicted based on the
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image features extracted from it:
ρˆ = [1, fI , fT , fS , fE , ..., fEfE ]θˆ. (2.29)
With the correlation predictor, p(x|H1) is modeled as the generalized Gaussian
distribution GG(ρˆ, σ1, α1), where the predicted correlation ρˆ is the mean, while the
scale parameter σ1 and the shape parameter α1 can be estimated from the difference
between the real and predicted correlations, i.e., ρ− ρˆ.
To detect forgeries in an image, the algorithm proceeds by sliding a 128×128-
pixel detection block across the image and evaluates the test statistic ρi = ρ(Ri,Wi)
for each block, where Wi and Ri are the noise residual and the reference SPN in the
block centered at pixel qi. If ρi < t, pixel qi is deemed as forged. Here the threshold
t is related with a constant false acceptance rate (CFAR) 10−5:
∫ ∞
t
p(x|H0)dx = 10−5. (2.30)
That is why this method is usually referred to as the constant false acceptance rate
(CFAR) method. However, for a highly textured or saturated block, even it is not
forged, its correlation still tends to be low due to the absence of SPN. So to avoid
labeling non-tampered pixels as tampered, pixel qi will be labeled as non-tampered
if ∫ t
−∞
p(x|H1)dx > β, (2.31)
where β was set to 0.01 in [9]. The resulting binary map uˆ ∈ {0, 1}M×N , which
indicates the forged pixels (1 for forgery and 0 for genuine pixel), is further dilated
with a square 20× 20 kernel to obtain the final result.
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2.3.3 Bayesian-MRF Based Method
The constant false acceptance rate (CFAR) method makes decisions independently
for each pixel, but it does not take into account the spatial dependencies exhibited by
natural images, which could generate fragmented and inconsistent binary map. To
penalize the isolated points or the small disjoint regions and provide smooth output,
Chierchia et al. adopted the Bayesian rule and Markov random field (MRF) model
to improve the detection results [72]. This Bayesian-MRF method is based on the
CFAR method but differs from it in both the formulation and the solution of the
problem. The forgery detection is formulated as a problem of finding the label
map uˆ ∈ {0, 1}M×N that has the maximum probability to occur given the known
information:
uˆ = argmax
u∈{0,1}M×N
p(ρ|u, ρˆ)p(u), (2.32)
where M×N is the image size, ρ is the actual correlations calculated in a block-wise
manner, and ρˆ is the predicted (or expected) correlations given by the correlation
predictor described in last section. In the above equation, p(ρ|u, ρˆ) is the conditional
likelihood of observing ρ, and p(u) is the prior probability that takes into account
the spatial dependencies of the pixels by resorting to the Markov random field model:
p(u) =
1
Z
e−
∑
c∈C Vc(u), (2.33)
where Z is a normalizing constant, and Vc(u) is the potential defined on cliques
c (i.e., small groups of neighboring pixels). Only the single-site cliques {c′} and
4-connected two-site cliques {c′′} are considered:
Vc′(ui) =

−α
2
if ui = 0
α
2
if ui = 1
(2.34)
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Vc′′(ui, uj) =

β if ui 6= uj
0 otherwise
(2.35)
where α = log(p0/p1) is related to the prior probability of forged p0 and non-
forged p1, and β is the edge-penalty parameter indicating how strong the interaction
between pixels is. After replacing p(u) with Equation (2.33) and taking the negative
log, Equation (2.32) can be rewritten as
uˆ = argmin
u∈{0,1}M×N
{
−
M×N∑
i=1
log p(ρi|ui, ρˆi) + α
M×N∑
i=1
ui + βR(u)
}
, (2.36)
where the regularization term R(u) =
∑M×N
i=1
∑
j∈Ni |uj − ui|, with Ni the set of
4-connected neighbors of i, is the sum of all class transitions over all 4-connected
cliques of the image. By assuming the likelihood probability to be Gaussian under
both hypotheses, with zero mean and variance σ20 under hypothesis H0, and mean
ρˆi and variance σ
2
1 under hypothesis H1, Equation (2.36) becomes
uˆ = argmin
u∈{0,1}M×N
{M×N∑
i=1
ui
[
(ρi − ρˆi)2
2σ21
− ρ
2
i
2σ20
− log σ0
σ1
− log p1
p0
]
+ βR(u)
}
. (2.37)
By resorting to the convex-optimization algorithm proposed in [73], the uˆ that
gives the maximal probability can be obtained. This method incorporates the prior
information and spatial dependencies between pixels, and therefore produces a more
consistent and smooth binary map.
2.3.4 Image Segmentation Based Methods
Despite the good results on detecting large tampered regions (e.g., larger than 128×
128 pixels) given by the above CFAR and Bayesian-MRF method, there is still a
need to improve the spatial resolution, allowing for detecting smaller forgeries. As
can be observed in the detection results presented in [9], the falsely identified areas
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are generally located around the boundary of the forged area. The reason is that,
when the detection block falls near the boundary between two different regions (i.e.,
forged and non-forged regions), the test statistic ρ is a weighted average of two
different contributions and more likely to exceed the decision threshold [74]. As a
result, miss detection occurs along the boundary. In [74], this problem is solved
by first segmenting the image under investigation. However, this method heavily
depends on the performance of image segmentation, which itself is a very challenging
and unreliable process. In [75], an algorithm based on the guided filtering [76] was
proposed to avoid the ill-posed image segmentation problem. The basic idea is to
post-process the calculated correlation map ρ by resorting to a pilot image, which
can be a combination of the color bands of the original image or its denoised version,
or any suitable field of features extracted from images [75]. The pilot image bears
some valuable information, such as geometrical structures, of the image content and
can be viewed as the soft-segmented version of the original image. By incorporating
the structure information of the image, the guided filtering is helpful in making a
better decision. However, either the hard segmentation based method [74] or the
soft segmentation based method [76] will fail on the so called occlusive forgeries,
where part of the background is copied and pasted to hide objects of the original
scene, e.g., an airplane is covered by a patch of blue sky. Actually, as pointed out
in [74], the use of segmentation-based decision is at great risks in such scenarios,
because the forged region would be a relatively small part of a large region and
the statistics calculated on the overall large region would become irrelevant in the
average.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we first introduced the typical process of SPN-based source camera
identification and reviewed the approaches that aim at improving the performance
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from the perspective of suppressing interfering sources, namely scene details, de-
mosaicing artifacts and periodic artifacts. We then discussed the image clusterings
algorithms based on camera fingerprints (SPNs) and the difficulties of directly ap-
plying other classic clustering methods on large-scale camera fingerprint databases.
Finally, we revisited the SPN-based image forgery detection algorithms in detail.
After introducing the SPN-based algorithms for each of the three image forensic
tasks (i.e., source camera identification, image clustering, and image forgery detec-
tion), we also pointed out the limitations of existing methods. These limitations
will be addressed in the following three chapters, each corresponding to one of the
three image forensic tasks.
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CHAPTER 3
Spectrum Equalization Algorithm for Preprocessing Reference
Sensor Pattern Noise
As mentioned in Section 2.1 of Chapter 3, although pattern noise (SPN) has been
proven to be an effective means to uniquely identify digital cameras, some non-
unique artifacts, shared amongst cameras subjected to the same or similar in-camera
processing procedures, often give rise to false identifications. Therefore, it is de-
sirable and necessary to suppress these unwanted artifacts so as to improve the
accuracy and reliability.
In this chapter, we propose a novel preprocessing approach for attenuat-
ing the influence of the non-unique artifacts on the reference SPN to reduce the
false identification rate. Specifically, we equalize the magnitude spectrum of the
reference SPN through detecting and suppressing the peaks according to the lo-
cal characteristics, aiming at removing the interfering periodic artifacts. Combined
with six SPN extraction or enhancement methods, our proposed Spectrum Equal-
ization Algorithm (SEA) is evaluated on the Dresden image database as well as
our own database, and compared with the state-of-the-art preprocessing schemes.
Experimental results indicate that the proposed procedure outperforms, or at least
performs comparably to the existing methods in terms of the overall ROC curve and
kappa statistic computed from a confusion matrix, and tends to be more resistant
to JPEG compression for medium and small image blocks.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section gives
a brief overview of the background. In Section 3.2, we revisit the previous works
through a case study and point out the limitations of existing preprocessing ap-
proaches. The details of the proposed preprocessing scheme, SEA, are presented in
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Section 3.3. Comprehensive experimental results and analysis for both the general
and special cases are given in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Introduction
One challenging problem of multimedia forensics is source camera identification
(SCI), the task of which is to reliably match a particular digital image with its
source device. Despite the methods based on metadata, or watermarking embedded
in the image, are effective in proving the source of an image, unfortunately they
are infeasible under many circumstances. For example, the metadata might not be
available, and legacy images might not be watermarked at the time when they were
created. In view of the limitations, researchers have switched their attention to the
methods that search for the intrinsic characteristics of digital cameras left in the
image. Generally speaking, any inherent traces left in the image by the processing
components, either hardware or software, of the image acquisition pipeline, such
as defective pixels [77, 78], color filter array (CFA) interpolation artifacts [41, 79],
JPEG compression artifacts [80, 81], lens aberration [82, 83] or the combination of
several image intrinsic characteristics [25, 84], can be utilized to link the images to
the source camera. Apart from the above-mentioned techniques, the methods that
attract the most attention may be those based on SPN [1, 3, 9, 45, 51, 55, 85],
which mainly consists of the photo-response non-uniformity (PRNU) noise [1] aris-
ing primarily from the manufacturing imperfections and the inhomogeneity of silicon
wafers. The uniqueness to individual camera and stability against environmental
conditions make SPN a feasible fingerprint for identifying and linking source cam-
eras.
However, the correlation-based detection of SPN heavily relies upon the qual-
ity of the extracted SPN, which can be severely contaminated by image content,
color interpolation, JPEG compression and other non-unique artifacts. To achieve
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high accuracy and reliability of identification, the size of SPN has to be very large,
for example, 512 × 512 pixels or above. But the large size of SPN limits its ap-
plicability in some scenarios. One example is image or video forgery localization
[6, 9, 72, 74, 86–88], where there exists a trade-off between localization and accuracy.
Another scenario is digital camcorder identification [89], where the spatial resolution
of video frames is usually much smaller than that of typical still images. One more
example is camera fingerprints (SPNs) clustering [57, 58, 60]. The complexity of
clustering is usually very high and the high dimension of SPNs will further bring
difficulties to computation and storage. The clustering algorithm is expected to use
SPNs of small size but still able to deliver good performance. Therefore, exploring
the ways of improving the quality of SPNs extracted from small-sized image blocks
becomes of great significance for the above-mentioned SPN-based applications.
In this chapter, we propose a new preprocessing scheme, namely Spectrum
Equalization Algorithm (SEA), for the reference SPN to enhance the performance
of SCI. If the reference SPN is modeled as white Gaussian noise (WGN), the the-
oretical analysis of WGN would indicate that the reference SPN should have a flat
magnitude spectrum. Peaks appearing in the spectrum are probably originated from
the periodic artifacts and unlikely to be associated with the true SPN. Therefore,
by detecting and suppressing the peaks in the spectrum, we can obtain more clean
(noise-like) signals. We will start by studying the limitations of existing preprocess-
ing schemes, and then propose our SEA in detail to overcome the limitations.
3.2 Reference SPN Preprocessing: A Case Study
As can be found in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2, most works [9, 45, 52] focus on the
processing of the reference SPN, only Li’s enhancers [3] are applied on the query
noise residual. The reason is that, the noise residual extracted from a single image
can be severely contaminated by interfering artifacts arisen from scene details, CFA
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.1: Filtering for the reference SPN of Canon PowerShot A400. (a) Spectrum
of the original reference SPN, (b) spectrum of the ZM filtered reference SPN, (c)
spectrum of the ZM + WF filtered reference SPN, (d) spectrum of white noise. For
visualization purposes, gamma correction with an exponent of 1.5 was applied to
the spectra.
interpolation, on-sensor signal transfer [90], JPEG compression and other image
processing operations. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to distinguish the true
SPN from the estimated SPN. While in the reference SPN, the random artifacts,
such as the shot noise, read-out noise and quantization noise have been averaged
out. Moreover, if the camera is available, we can take high-quality images, such as
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blue sky or flat field images, to better estimate the reference SPN. As a result, we
can easily incorporate our prior knowledge of SPN to refine the estimated reference
SPN. In [9], for example, Chen et al. proposed the zero-meaning (ZM) procedure
to remove the artifacts introduced by CFA interpolation, row-wise and column-wise
operations of sensors or processing circuits, as well as the Wiener filtering (WF)
procedure to suppress the the visually identifiable patterns in the ZM processed
signal. Specifically, row and column averages are deducted from every pixel in the
corresponding row and column of the reference SPN R to form the zero-meaned
reference SPN Rzm. The WF procedure is carried out by transforming Rzm into the
discrete Fourier transform (DFT) domain, Dzm, and applying the Wiener filter on
each frequency index [u, v]
Dwf [u, v] = Dzm[u, v]
σ20
σˆ2[u, v] + σ20
, (3.1)
where σ20 represents the overall variance of Rzm, and σˆ
2[u, v] is the maximum a
posterior estimation of the local variance
σˆ2[u, v] = min
w∈{3,5,7,9}
[
max
(
0,
1
w2
∑
[k,l]∈Nw
D2zm[k, l]− σ20
)]
, (3.2)
where Nw is a w×w local neighborhood centered at [u, v]. The final reference SPN
Rwf is obtained by applying the inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT) on Dwf .
We conducted experiments on a Canon PowerShot A400 to see how well ZM
and WF suppress the visually identifiable patterns in the DFT spectrum. The refer-
ence SPN was estimated from 50 blue sky images captured by the Canon PowerShot
A400 using BM3D [5]. Note that although we used the noise residues extracted us-
ing BM3D [5], similar results can be observed for the SPNs extracted using other
extraction methods [1, 4, 9]. The white noise is drawn from the normal distribution
with zero mean and the same variance as the original SPN. The DFT magnitude
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spectra of the original reference SPN and its counterparts processed by ZM and
ZM+WF are shown in Fig. 3.1(a), 3.1(b) and 3.1(c), respectively. For the purpose
of visualization, the zero-frequency component has been shifted to the center of the
spectrum. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, we use the term “spectrum”
to refer to the DFT magnitude spectrum hereinafter. For comparison, the spectrum
of random white noise is also illustrated in Fig. 3.1(d). As can be seen, the peaks
resulted from the periodic artifacts can be easily identified in the DFT domain (Fig.
3.1(a)). As we know that the peaks associated with one signal with period T will
appear in the locations (UT u,
V
T v), where U and V are the dimensions of the spec-
trum, and u, v ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. Thus, what is striking in Fig. 3.1(a) is that most
of the peaks are resulted from the artifacts with period 8 (as indicated by the green
arrows), but some of them are brought about by the artifacts with period 16 (as
indicated by the red arrows). Due to the symmetry of the spectrum, only the peaks
in one quadrant are illustrated in Fig. 3.1(a). But as shown in Fig. 3.1(b), after
applying the ZM operation, the horizontal and vertical DC components are com-
pletely removed as hinted by the two “dark” intersecting lines passing through the
center of the spectrum. Though the magnitudes of other frequency components re-
main quantitatively unchanged, the remaining peaks become visually more distinct
as the peaks with dominating values have been removed. ZM removes all the DC
components in the spectrum, so any artifacts lying in the two central “dark” lines
will be also removed.
However, when comparing with the spectrum in Fig. 3.1(d), we found that
ZM seems overly aggressive in modifying the DC components. If the WF opera-
tion is further applied to the ZM filtered SPN in the DFT domain, we can get the
resultant spectrum as shown in 3.1(c). According to Equation (3.1), a magnitude
spectrum coefficient, Dzm[u, v], with a larger local variance, σˆ
2[u, v], will be sup-
pressed more substantially than the one with a smaller local variance. Normally,
the variance in the low-frequency region is relatively larger than that in the high-
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frequency region. As shown in Fig. 3.1(c), most of the spectral energy concentrates
in the low-frequency region, and therefore is suppressed more significantly. As a
consequence, the spectrum in Fig. 3.1(c) looks “flatter” than that in Fig. 3.1(b).
So with the help of ZM and WF, three improvements have been made: 1) any
artifacts appearing in DC components are completely removed, 2) the spectrum is
more noise-like (flat) and 3) the peaks arisen from periodic artifacts are significantly
suppressed. Despite the peaks in the low-frequency region have been suppressed ef-
fectively, those in the high-frequency region are less affected, which can be clearly
seen from the “white” points in Fig. 3.1(c). Therefore, in view of the effects of ZM
and WF, ZM is overly aggressive in modifying the DC components and WF appears
to be too conservative in suppressing the peaks in the high-frequency band. These
shortcomings leave room for improving the quality of reference SPN.
3.3 Spectrum Equalization Algorithm (SEA)
As mentioned at the start of Section 3.2, the “purity” of the reference SPN makes
it more suitable to be modified by incorporating prior knowledge of SPN, such
as the fact that the true SPN signal is unlikely to be periodic and should have
a flat spectrum. But the key problem is how to incorporate the prior knowledge
appropriately and modify the reference SPN accordingly. When comparing the
spectra of the ZM and WF filtered SPN with that of white noise, we can see that
the horizontal and vertical DC components are completely removed and the peaks
in the high-frequency band are still visible. Besides, the low-frequency components
in the spectrum probably have been severely contaminated by scene details, so it
is difficult to distinguish the true SPN signal from other low-frequency artifacts.
So without enough information to ensure the global “flatness” (i.e., flatness across
the entire spectrum), can we just ensure the local “flatness” of the spectrum by
simply removing the salient peaks within a local neighborhood? Identifying the
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periodic artifacts responsible for the prominent peaks in the spectrum can help us
better understand the problem and find an appropriate solution. We summarize the
periodic artifacts as follows:
• CFA interpolation artifacts. A typical CFA interpolation is accomplished
by estimating the missing components from spatially adjacent pixels according
to the component-location information indicated by a specific CFA pattern.
As CFA patterns form a periodic structure, measurable offset gains will result
in periodic biases in the interpolated image [9]. The periodic biases manifest
themselves as peaks in the DFT spectrum, and the locations of the peaks
depend on the configuration of the CFA pattern.
• JPEG blockiness artifacts. In JPEG compression, non-overlapping 8 × 8
pixel blocks are coded with DCT independently. So aggressive JPEG compres-
sion causes blockiness artifacts, which manifest themselves in the U ×V -point
DFT spectrum as peaks in the positions (U8 u,
V
8 v), where u, v ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}.
• Diagonal artifacts. As reported in [53], unexpected diagonal artifacts were
observed for the reference SPN of Nikon CoolPix. Although the cause is
yet to be investigated, the artifacts manifest themselves in the spectrum as
peaks in the frequency positions corresponding to the row and column period
introduced by the diagonal artifacts.
Given that the noise-like SPN should have a flat spectrum without salient
peaks, the rationale, which forms the basis of the proposed SEA for preprocessing
the reference SPN, is that the peaks present in the DFT spectrum are unlikely to
be associated with the true SPN, and the unnatural traces usually appear in the
form of periodic patterns, such as the 2 × 2 or 4 × 4 CFA patterns, 8 × 8 JPEG
blockiness and so on, which correspond to the peaks in fixed positions of spectrum.
By suppressing these peaks, SPN of better quality can be obtained.
52
3.3 Spectrum Equalization Algorithm (SEA)
Procedure 1 Spectrum Peak Detection
R: original reference SPN of U × V pixels;
w: size of a local neighborhood;
τ1, τ2: two thresholds for peak detection, τ1 < τ2;
P: U × V binary map of detected peak locations;
1: Calculate the magnitude spectrum D = DFT(R);
2: Initialize two U × V binary maps P1 = P2 = 0;
3: Initialize two U × V mean matrices M1 = M2 = 0;
4: count = 0; u = 1 to U v = 1 to V
5: M1[u, v] =
∑
[k,l]∈Nw|D[k,l]|P˜1[k,l]∑
[k,l]∈Nw P˜1[k,l]
;
6: M2[u, v] =
∑
[k,l]∈Nw|D[k,l]|P˜2[k,l]∑
[k,l]∈Nw P˜2[k,l]
;
7: P1 = L
( |D|
M1
≥ τ1
)
;
8: P2 = L
( |D|
M2
≥ τ2
)
;
9: count = count+ 1; count > 2
10: Create a U × V binary matrix B, with 1s only at indices ( U16u, V16v), u, v =
0, 1, . . . , 15;
11: Screen out spurious peaks P = P1&B|P2;
12: P;
Procedure 2 Spectrum Peak Suppression
R: original reference SPN of U × V pixels;
P: U × V detected peak locations;
w: size of a local neighborhood;
RSEA: U × V spectrum equalized reference SPN;
1: D = DFT(R); u = 1 to U v = 1 to V
2: L[u, v] =
∑
[k,l]∈Nw|D[k,l]|P˜ [k,l]∑
[k,l]∈Nw P˜ [k,l]
;
3: RSEA = IDFT(
LD
|D| );
4: RSEA;
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SEA consists of peak detection and peak suppression, as detailed in Procedure
1 and Procedure 2, respectively. The peaks in the spectrum of the reference SPN are
detected by comparing the ratio of the spectrum to the local mean with a threshold,
as shown in Steps 12 and 13 of Procedure 1. When calculating the local mean within
a neighborhood w centered at [u, v] in Steps 8 and 9 of Procedure 1, the tilde sign
“∼” over P1 and P2 is the logical negation operator, which excludes the spectral
components indicated by the logical 0s in P1 and P2 from the calculation of the
local mean M. L(·) in Steps 12 and 13 labels any nonzero entry of input to logical ‘1’
and zero to logical ‘0’, so the peaks in the magnitude spectrum D will be disclosed
by the logical 1s stored in P1 and P2. The above steps are repeated 3 times to make
the peak detection more accurate. Finally in Step 17, ‘&’ and ‘|’ are the logical AND
and OR operator, respectively, so the potential spurious peaks not at the indices
( U16u,
V
16v), u = 0, 1, . . . , 15, and v = 0, 1, . . . , 15 are screened out. Having identified
the peak locations, the peaks are suppressed by simply replacing them with the
local mean intensities in the spectrum, as shown in Step 4 of Procedure 2. There
are several remarks need to be made for SEA:
• We use two thresholds τ1 and τ2, with τ1 < τ2, for peak detection in Steps
12 and 13 of Procedure 1. The underlying motivation for this particular con-
sideration is to detect peaks more liberally by using a smaller threshold τ1 in
Step 12 to avoid missing the peak positions signified in B (corresponding to
a period of 16 pixels) in Step 16 of Procedure 1, but more conservatively by
using a larger threshold τ2 in Step 13 in other positions to avoid distorting
the true SPN. Because spurious peaks are more likely to be detected with a
smaller threshold τ1, suppressing these spurious peaks will probably distort
the true SPN. But with a larger threshold τ2, the prominent peaks can be
detected without worrying about being excessively modified.
• We only consider the artifacts with a period of up to 16 pixels. Albeit the fact
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that the artifacts sometimes appear with different periods, such as the 3×3 or
6× 6 CFA pattern, and they may also contain components with period larger
than 16. The justification is twofold: 1) the 2 × 2 and 4 × 4 are the most
common CFA patterns; 2) peaks caused by the artifacts with other periods
may overlap in the peak locations hinted in B. For example, half of the peaks
caused by the 32 × 32 periodic signal will appear in the peak locations of B.
As a consequence, peaks in positions indicated by B account for the dominant
components caused by the majority of periodic artifacts, which is consistent
with our observation in Fig. 3.1 and the following experiments in Section 3.4.5.
Even if the prominent peaks are missed out by B, they will still be caught out
by P2.
• Although some similarity measurements, such as PCE, CCN or SPCE, also aim
at suppressing the periodic noise contamination, there are two fundamental
differences between our SEA and the aforementioned similarity measurements:
1. The calculation of the similarity measure involves the reference SPN and
the query noise residual. However, the query noise residual is likely to be
severely contaminated by other interfering artifacts. As a consequence,
even for the query noise residual extracted from a high-quality image, the
periodic patterns are very inconspicuous, making the peaks discovered by
the circular cross correlation in PCE, CCN and SPCE not so remarkable
as those found in the spectrum of the reference SPN.
2. The similarity measurements require extra computation for every SPN
pair, which will largely increase the computational complexity. However,
with the proposed SEA, we only need to apply it on the reference SPN
once for all, which will save a considerable amount of time for large
databases.
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3.4 Experiments
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
We first evaluated the performance of the proposed preprocessing scheme on the
Dresden Image Database [91]. The basic information of the used cameras can be
found in Table 3.1. 49 cameras, covering 15 models and 10 brands, that have
contributed 50 flatfield images were chosen. The 50 flatfield images were used to es-
timate the reference SPN for each camera, and another 150 natural images captured
by the same camera served as query images. As mentioned in [53], unexpected arti-
facts were observed in the estimated reference SPN of Nikon CoolPix S710, FujiFilm
FinePix J50 and Casio EX-Z150, so we will take special care for the 13 cameras of
these 3 models after analyzing the remaining 36 cameras as the general cases.
Apart from the effectiveness, the robustness of the proposed scheme against
JPEG compression was also investigated on our own uncompressed image database,
as detailed in Table 3.2. 600 natural images taken in BMP format by six cameras
were used in this experiment. The images contain a wide variety of natural indoor
and outdoor scenes taken during holidays, around campus and cities, in offices and
sports center, etc. Among the 100 images captured by each camera, 50 were ran-
domly chosen to estimate the reference SPN, and the other 50 were used as query
images. For each BMP image, compressed images were produced by libjpeg [92]
with quality factor of 100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60% and 50%. Therefore, 6 groups
JPEG images, i.e., 3, 600 in total, with different quality factors were generated.
We aim to compare the performances of different preprocessing schemes, but
with different SPN extraction techniques continue to appear, it would be interesting
to see how well the preprocessing schemes work in conjunction with existing SPN
extractors. What is more, comparing the performance of different algorithms on
real-world databases provides insight into the advantages and disadvantages of each
algorithm, and offers a valuable reference for practical applications. Bearing this in
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Camera Model Resolution Number of devices
Canon Ixus55 2, 592× 1, 944 1
Canon Ixus70 3, 072× 2, 304 3
Casio EX-Z150 3, 264× 2, 448 5
FujiFilm FinePix J50 3, 264× 2, 448 3
Nikon CoolPix S710 4, 352× 3, 264 5
Olympus Mju 1050SW 3, 648× 2, 736 5
Pentax OptioA40 4, 000× 3, 000 4
Pentax OptioW60 3, 648× 2, 736 1
Praktica DCZ5.9 2, 560× 1, 920 5
Rollei RCP-7325XS 3, 072× 2, 304 3
Samsung L74wide 3, 072× 2, 304 3
Samsung NV15 3, 648× 2, 736 3
Sony DSC-H50 3, 456× 2, 592 2
Sony DSC-T77 3, 648× 2, 736 4
Sony DSC-W170 3, 648× 2, 736 2
Table 3.1: 49 cameras involved in the creation of the images in the Dresden
database
mind, we incorporated six SPN extraction or enhance algorithms in the experiments.
For the sake of convenience, we refer to the technique in [1] as “Basic”, [9] as “MLE”,
[3] as “Enhancer”, [5] as “BM3D”, [45] as “Phase”, and [4] as “PCAI8”. Although
“Enhancer” only enhances the query noise residual and has nothing to do with the
noise extraction, hereinafter we refer to all these six algorithms as SPN extractors
for convenience. For the preprocessing schemes, we refer to zero-mean operation as
ZM, the Wiener filter in the DFT domain as WF, the combination of ZM and WF
operations as ZM+WF, and the proposed spectrum equalization algorithm as SEA.
3.4.2 Parameters Setting
For Basic [1], MLE [9] and Phase [45], we used the source codes published in [55, 56].
For Li’s Enhancers [3], we adopted Model 3 with α = 6 because it shows better
results than his other models. For BM3D [5], we downloaded the source codes from
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Camera Model Resolution Number of images
Canon 450D 4, 272× 2, 848 100
Canon Ixus870 1, 600× 1, 200 100
Nikon D90 4, 288× 2, 848 100
Nikon E3200 2, 048× 1, 536 100
Olympus C3100Z 2, 048× 1, 536 100
Panasonic DMC-LX2 3, 168× 2, 376 100
Table 3.2: 6 cameras involved in the creation of the images in our own database
[93] and simply used the default parameters. To facilitate fair comparison, we set
the noise variance σ20 = 4 for all the algorithms that use Mihcak filter [2], as well as
BM3D and PCAI8.
For SEA, the neighborhood size w and the thresholds τ1 and τ2 for peaks
detection depend on the strength of periodic artifacts and the spectrum distribution.
If the neighborhood size or threshold is too small, the peaks detector is too sensitive
to local variations. But if the neighborhood size or threshold is too large, it cannot
capture the local characteristics of the spectrum. We experimentally set w to 17
and 15 (selected from [8, 32]) for Procedures 1 and 2, respectively. The thresholds
τ1 and τ2 in Procedure 1 are set to 3.0 and 3.4 (selected from [2.0, 5.0]), respectively.
From the visual observation of the spectrum, the selected parameters work well for
the cameras we have tested in the Dresden database. For all the methods involved,
only the green channel of images is used. In addition, to better simulate the real-
world applications such as image or video forgery localization, the experiments were
performed on image blocks with different sizes cropped from the center of the full-
resolution images due to the vignetting effects [94]. When needed in the rest of this
chapter, we will use the terms “large”, “medium” and “small” to refer to the sizes
of 1024×1024, 256×256 and 64×64 pixels, respectively. It is worth noting that all
preprocessing schemes will only be applied on the reference SPN due to the reason
mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.2. In the following experiments, NCC, as
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defined in Equation (2.2), will be used as the similarity measurement between the
reference SPN and the query noise residual, but the results of SPCE, as defined in
Equation (2.24), will also be presented when necessary.
3.4.3 Evaluation Statistics
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed preprocessing scheme, we adopted
two evaluation statistics, namely the overall receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve [4, 45] and the kappa statistic [95] computed from a confusion matrix.
To obtain the overall ROC curve, for a given detection threshold, the true
positives and false positives are recorded for each camera, then these numbers are
summed up and used to calculate the True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive
Rate (FPR). Specifically, as the numbers of images captured by each camera are
exactly the same, we can simply calculate the TPR and FPR for a threshold as
follows: 
TPR =
∑C
i=1 Ti
T
FPR =
∑C
i=1Fi
(C − 1)T ,
(3.3)
where C is the number of cameras, T is the total number of query images, Ti and Fi
are the true positives and false positives of camera i, respectively. By varying the
detection threshold from the minimum to the maximum value as calculated using
Equation (2.2), we can obtain the overall ROC curve.
To obtain the confusion matrix M, we calculated the similarity between
the noise residue of one query image and the reference SPN of each camera, then
this image was deemed to be taken by the camera corresponding to the maximal
similarity. The value of each element M[i, j] in the confusion matrix indicates the
number of images taken by camera i that have been linked to camera j as the source
device. In other words, the values along the main diagonal indicate the numbers
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of correct identifications. Each confusion matrix can be reduced to a single value
metric, kappa statistic K [95]:
K = o− e
T − e, (3.4)
where o is the number of observed correct identifications, i.e., the trace of confusion
matrix, T is the total number of query images, and e is the number of expected
correct identifications:
e =
C∑
c=1
∑C
i=1M[c, i]
∑C
j=1M[j, c]
T
, (3.5)
where C is the number of cameras. Kappa statistic measures the disagreement
between the observed results and random guess, therefore the larger the value of K,
the better the performance, with 1 indicating the perfect performance.
The reason why both the overall ROC curve and the kappa statistic are used
is that we want to properly evaluate the performances of two different SPN-based
real-world applications, SCI and forgery detection, which are the same in essence
while differing in minor points. Normally, in the task of forgery detection, the
similarity measurement, between the reference SPN and the noise residue extracted
from the image block in question, is directly compared with a threshold suggested
by some criterion, such as the Neyman-Pearson criterion, to determine whether
the image block has been tampered with or not. This process is equivalent to
the generation of one point in the ROC curve, therefore it is more appropriate to
evaluate the performance of forgery detection using the overall ROC curve. While in
the context of SCI, the query image is believed to be taken by the camera with the
maximal similarity which is greater than a predefined threshold at the same time.
It is more like the process of creating a confusion matrix. So the kappa statistic
computed from a confusion matrix is a preferable evaluation statistic for SCI.
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3.4.4 General Cases
Before delving into the details, let us first look at a straightforward comparison of the
effects of different preprocessing on the spectrum of the reference SPN. Fig. 3.2(a)-
3.2(c) are the corresponding 3D spectra of Fig. 3.1(a)-3.1(c), while Fig. 3.2(d) shows
the spectrum of the SEA filtered SPN. To reduce the dynamic range of magnitudes
and make the peaks more conspicuous, a 3 × 3 averaging filter is convolved with
the spectrum beforehand. As can be clearly seen in Fig. 3.2(d), when compared
with the spectrum processed by the ZM and ZM+WF, the “spiky” interferences
have been nicely smoothed out by SEA while the rest of the spectrum still remains
untouched. In this manner, the true SPN has been preserved as much as possible.
The advantages of SEA can also be observed in Fig. 3.3, where we show
the estimated inter-class (in light blue color) and intra-class (in light green color)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.2: (a) Spectrum of the original reference SPN and the ones preprocessed
by (b) ZM, (c) ZM+WF and (d) SEA.
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Figure 3.3: Estimated inter-class and intra-class PDFs of ρ calculated from SPNs
extracted from 3 different sizes of image blocks using BM3D. From top to bottom,
the rows show the distributions for image blocks sized 1024 × 1024, 256 × 256 and
64× 64 pixels, respectively. From left to right, the distributions are resulting from
the original reference SPN and the ones preprocessed by ZM, ZM+WF and SEA,
respectively.
probability density functions (PDFs) of the correlation value ρ for the 36 cameras in
the Dresden database. The values outside the range of [−0.05, 0.1] are cut off to make
the figures look more compact. As shown in the first column, due to the long right-
hand tail of the inter-class distribution, there are a considerable amount of overlaps
between the inter-class and intra-class distributions if no preprocessing is applied.
After ZM and WF are applied sequentially, the long tail on the right-hand side
of the inter-class distribution is curtailed and the inter-class variances significantly
decrease from 2.46× 10−4, 3.49× 10−4 and 6.04× 10−4 to 1.44× 10−6, 2.65× 10−5
and 3.55 × 10−4 for large, medium and small image blocks, respectively. As a
result, the overlaps between the inter-class and intra-class correlation distribution
are reduced substantially. Compared with the inter-class distribution brought about
by ZM+WF, the resulting inter-class distribution of SEA looks even “thinner”,
with a smaller variance 1.89 × 10−5 and 2.95 × 10−4 for medium and small image
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blocks, respectively. The smaller variance of inter-class distribution makes the two
distributions more separable from each other, and therefore boosts the performance.
For the large size, 1024×1024 pixels, the variance of inter-class distribution for SEA
is 1.47× 10−6, which is slightly larger than that of ZM+WF, 1.44× 10−6. But the
intra-class mean for SEA, 0.05, is slightly larger than the 0.045 for ZM+WF. So
considering these two aspects, SEA and ZM+WF are comparable to each other in
the case of large image blocks, which will also be quantitatively reflected in Fig. 3.4
and 3.5. In addition, we can see that the inter-class distribution resulting from SEA
fits quite well to the theoretical distribution, which is a normal distribution with 0
mean and 1/d variance (in red dashed lines), where d is the length of SPNs.
We will reveal more details on the comparison of different combinations of
SPN extraction algorithms and preprocessing schemes in terms of the overall ROC
curve. Fig. 3.4 shows the overall ROC curves of the combinations of the six SPN ex-
traction algorithms and three preprocessing schemes on image blocks with different
sizes. As it is desirable to see the TPR at a low FPR, the ROC curves are plotted
in the logarithmic scale to show more details of the area where a FPR is low. The
curves for the original reference SPN and the ones filtered by ZM, ZM+WF and
SEA are highlighted in red, cyan, green and pink colors, respectively. With respect
to different preprocessing schemes, the pink lines keep standing over other lines in
Fig. 3.4 for different sizes and different extraction algorithms, indicating SEA stands
out at the top of the list. ZM+WF takes the second place, followed sequentially by
ZM and without preprocessing. In the case of large image size, the superiority of
SEA over ZM+WF is not apparent, but SEA is in a clearly advantageous position
especially for medium and small image blocks, i.e., 256 × 256 and 64 × 64 pixels.
In the case with large block size, except for the Phase method, SEA and ZM+WF
outperform the other two schemes by a wide TPR margin, more than 0.6 for a FPR
smaller than 1× 10−3.
Fig. 3.5 depicts the TPRs at a FPR as small as 1 × 10−3. The dark red
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Figure 3.4: Overall ROC curves of the combinations of different SPN extractors and
preprocessing schemes (different columns) on different image block sizes (different
rows). From left to right, the columns show the ROC curves for image blocks of
1024 × 1024, 256 × 256 and 64 × 64 pixels, respectively. Please refer to the last
column for the legend text, which is the same for the figures in the same row.
dotted line shows the average of each group corresponding to one preprocessing
scheme. Generally speaking, preprocessing can substantially increase the TPR at
a low FPR. Similar with the observation in Fig. 3.3, SEA is equally matched with
ZM+WF for large image size, but has higher TPRs than ZM+WF for medium and
64
3.4 Experiments
small sizes. With regard to different SPN extractors, Phase is stable against var-
ious preprocessing, resulting in its outstanding position when preprocessing is not
applied. The underlying reason is that Phase only retains the phase component but
ignores the magnitude components of each noise residual that are used to estimate
the reference SPN. In this way, the periodic artifacts have been suppressed consid-
erably but not completely removed. So preprocessing can further, although slightly,
improve the performance of Phase, as can be seen from the green bins in Fig. 3.5.
The performance of Basic, MLE and Enhancer are equivalent in many respects, but
Enhancer exceeds the other two when combined with SEA. Interestingly, BM3D and
PCAI8 perform worse than the other SPN extractors when no or little preprocessing
is applied, but they outperform other extractors with the help of ZM+WF or SEA.
By using the non-local information to get the better noise estimation [5], it is not
surprising that BM3D performs consistently the best among all six extractors in
case of being combined with SEA. It is also worth mentioning that PCAI8 performs
even worse than Phase when combined with ZM or ZM+WF. This is probably due
to insufficient images to create trustworthy reference SPN [4].
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA0
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Basic MLE Enhancer
Phase BM3D PCAI8
(a)
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA0
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(c)
Figure 3.5: TPRs at the FPR of 1× 10−3 for image blocks sized (a) 1024× 1024 (b)
256× 256 and (c) 64× 64 pixels.
Similar tendencies can be observed from the kappa statistics listed in Table
3.3-3.5. To clearly show which extraction methods and which preprocessing schemes
perform better, the maximal entry of each column is highlighted with a gray back-
ground, and the maximum value of each row is highlighted in bold. That is to say,
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a gray background in a column denotes the best extraction method when combined
with the preprocessing scheme corresponding to the column, while a bold value in a
row signifies the best preprocessing scheme for the corresponding extraction method
of the row. So the optimal combination of extraction method and preprocessing
scheme is the entry in both gray background and bold font style. As shown in the
three tables, most of the bold numbers appear in the last two columns, indicating the
effectiveness of ZM+WF and SEA. The most apparent example is PCAI8, of which
the kappa statistic increases by approximately 0.2 after preprocessed by ZM+WF or
SEA when the image block size is 256×256 pixels. For the case of 64×64 blocks, in
spite of the slight performance improvements, the reference SPNs extracted with the
Michak filter seem to be vulnerable to preprocessing. But for the other two extrac-
tors, BM3D and PCAI8, the performance gain is still noticeable. Special attention
should be paid to Table 3.3, where ZM+WF performs slightly better than SEA.
The average kappa statistic gap 0.0006, between SEA and ZM+WF, is negligible
when compared with the average kappa statistic gain 0.0162 and 0.02 in the cases
of medium and small image blocks, respectively. To understand it more intuitively,
we took a close look at the confusion matrix. We found that, for image blocks sized
1024×1024 pixels, ZM+WF has only about an average of 3 more correctly classified
images than SEA among the 5400 images from 36 cameras. But the average number
of correctly classified images by SEA is around 85 and 105 more than ZM+WF for
the medium and small image blocks, respectively. As for different extractors, Basic,
MLE and Enhancer perform comparably well in all conditions. This is consistent
with our observations in Fig. 3.4 and 3.5. As indicated by the gray backgrounds in
the 3 tables, BM3D shows a clear superiority over other extractors. Moreover, with
the help of SEA, BM3D exhibits the superior (or at least equivalent) performance
over other combinations for all block sizes. Therefore, the joint use of BM3D and
SEA is preferable for both forgery detection and SCI in practice.
JPEG is probably the most common image format used in digital cameras,
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Preprocessing
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA
Basic 0.9236 0.9644 0.9691 0.9684
MLE 0.9236 0.9646 0.9695 0.9682
Enhancer 0.9059 0.9623 0.9722 0.9701
Phase 0.9650 0.9632 0.9610 0.9629
BM3D 0.9192 0.9651 0.9718 0.9714
PCAI8 0.7366 0.9545 0.9701 0.9691
Table 3.3: Kappa statistics for 1024× 1024 image blocks
Preprocessing
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA
Basic 0.7943 0.8676 0.8697 0.8895
MLE 0.7943 0.8674 0.8697 0.8897
Enhancer 0.7922 0.8714 0.8785 0.8979
Phase 0.8770 0.8710 0.8573 0.8691
BM3D 0.8097 0.8912 0.8901 0.9242
PCAI8 0.6634 0.8269 0.8703 0.8621
Table 3.4: Kappa statistics for 256× 256 image blocks
so we compared the robustness of ZM+WF and SEA against JPEG compression.
The experiments were carried out for different image sizes and different SPN ex-
tractors. Sometimes the source devices are available to capture high-quality images
for reference SPN estimation. So under this scenario, we can use the reference SPN
estimated from images with a high quality factor 100% for each of the six cameras in
Table 3.2, and calculate the similarity between the high-quality reference SPN and
the query noise residual extracted from images with different quality factors. But
the more plausible scenario is that only the images rather than the source devices
are available. So we simulated this scenario by estimating the reference SPN using
the images with the same JPEG quality as the query images. The ratios of the
kappa statistics of SEA to that of ZM+WF for these two scenarios are shown in the
first and second column of Fig. 3.6, respectively. The dark red dotted lines show
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Preprocessing
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA
Basic 0.4116 0.4067 0.3962 0.4070
MLE 0.4122 0.4072 0.3952 0.4086
Enhancer 0.4061 0.4030 0.3907 0.4044
Phase 0.4055 0.3735 0.3724 0.3859
BM3D 0.4838 0.4865 0.4625 0.5046
PCAI8 0.3918 0.4166 0.4010 0.4276
Table 3.5: Kappa statistics for 64× 64 image blocks
the average of each group corresponding to one quality factor. A ratio greater than
1 indicates that SEA outplays ZM+WF. We adjusted the y-axis limits to accommo-
date bins with various heights. As indicated by the dotted lines, the generally higher
average ratios in the second column benefit from SEA’s high capability of removing
the more evident JPEG artifacts in the reference SPN estimated from more aggres-
sively compressed images. For the medium (Fig. 3.6(c) and 3.6(d)) and the small
(Fig. 3.6(e) and 3.6(f)) image sizes, most of the average kappa statistics are higher
than 1, indicating SEA’s superiority over ZM+WF. The growing preponderance of
the ratios as the images undergo more aggressive JPEG compression, especially in
the second column, indicates that SEA tends to be more robust against JPEG com-
pression for medium and small image blocks. But surprisingly, ZM+WF performs
better than SEA in the case of large image blocks. We carefully investigated the
spectra of the six cameras and found that unlike the peaks spreading out over the
spectrum, as shown in Fig. 3.1(a), all the prominent peaks appear in the borders
of the spectrum and the locations indicated by the two “dark” lines in Fig. 3.1(b),
which can be completely removed by ZM. But for large images, the components
overly modified by ZM are not so considerable as for small images. Therefore, it
introduces bias in favor of ZM+WF for large image size. Another cause comes from
the fact that by using larger image blocks, it is more likely to have a more enriched
and spread-out spectrum, and therefore make some of the peaks fade away into the
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background. It is also the reason why SEA limits the further improvement for large
blocks in Fig. 3.4 and Table 3.3.
We then measured the average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of noise residue
(extracted from the uncompressed BMP images) and JPEG quantization noises to
the uncompressed images for each of the six cameras. As shown in Fig. 3.7, when
the JPEG quality factor drops to 70%, the SNR of quantization noise is even higher
than that of noise residual for four of the six cameras. It indicates that the impact
of JPEG compression on the quality of SPN and thus the identification performance
can be significant. For example, with 256 × 256 blocks, when the quality factor of
the query images decreases from 100% to 70%, the average kappa statistic over six
extractors dramatically declines from 0.9433 to 0.6533 for SEA, and from 0.9460
to 0.6360 for ZM+WF in the first scenario, and even lower in the second scenario,
with an average kappa statistic of 0.5767 for SEA and 0.5487 for ZM+WF. But the
effects of JPEG compression appear to be much less severe for 1024× 1024 blocks.
Even for the 50% quality factor and the second scenario, the average kappa statistics
are still considerable, with 0.7680 for SEA and 0.7800 for ZM+WF. So with large
enough block size, even if the images undergo high JPEG compression, accurate SCI
is still possible.
3.4.5 Special Cases
As mentioned in [53], some unexpected artifacts, which might have stemmed from
the dependencies between sensor noise and special camera settings or some advanced
in-camera post-processing, were observed in the images taken by Nikon CoolPix
S710, FujiFilm FinePix J50 and Casio EX-150. More specifically, a diagonal pat-
tern can be clearly seen in the reference SPN of Nikon CoolPix S710 in the spatial
domain and manifests itself as peaks in the DFT domain (see Fig. 3.8(a) and 3.8(b)).
As the diagonal structures are only observed in images taken by CoolPix S710, it
is probably due to the special in-camera post-processing in CoolPix S710. For Fu-
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Figure 3.6: Ratios of the kappa statistic of SEA to that of ZM+WF for the cases
of estimating the reference SPN from JPEG images with a quality factor 100 (first
column) and JPEG images with the same quality factor as the query images (second
column). Bins are grouped according to the quality factor of the query images, and
each of the six bins in the same group shows the ratio for one of the six SPN
extractors. From top to bottom, the rows show the results for image blocks of
1024× 1024, 256× 256 and 64× 64 pixels.
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Figure 3.7: SNR for noise residual and the quantization noise introduced by JPEG
compression.
jiFilm FinePix J50, the identification results have a relationship with the difference
between the exposure times when capturing the images used for estimating the ref-
erence and the image used for extracting the query noise residual. It is possibly
that some exposure-time-dependent post-processing procedure is employed in Fuji-
Film FinePix J50, for instance to suppress the noise [53]. The experimental results
also confirm that SPNs of FujiFilm FinePix J50 at exposure times ≥ 1/60s exhibit
pixel shifts in horizontal direction. The worst case among the three models is Casio
EX-150, the identification performance of which is very poor for images taken at
different focal length settings. The image distortions become clear by showing the
p-maps [29] of images acquired by EX-150. The origin of the artifacts are still un-
known to us, but it reminds us to pay particular attention to these 3 models. Thus,
separate experiments have been conducted for the 13 cameras of these 3 special
models. We only conducted the experiments on blocks of 256 × 256 pixels, since
similar properties and trends were observed for other sizes. The kappa statistics
based on both NCC and SPCE are listed in Table 3.6-3.8 for a more comprehensive
comparison. Comparing the kappa statistics of different preprocessing schemes in
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Table 3.6-3.7, we found that SEA can improve the performance for Nikon CoolPix
S710 and FujiFilm FinePix J50. When taking a closer look at Table 3.6 for Nikon
CoolPix S710, the performances of all preprocessing methods are comparable in
terms of NCC and SPCE. But compared with ZM+WF, the advantage of SEA
becomes obvious in Table 3.7 for FujiFilm FinePix J50. For instance, the kappa
statistic of Enhancer increases from 0.7633 to 0.8100 in terms of NCC, and from
0.7700 to 0.8033 in terms of SPCE. However, for Casio EX-150, in spite of the slight
performance gain brought about by preprocessing, correct and reliable identifica-
tions are still impossible for the images captured by this model. Another important
observation is that the performances of ZM+WF+SPCE and SEA+NCC are com-
parable for Nikon CoolPix S710 and Casio EX-150, as shown in Table 3.6 and 3.8,
but SEA+NCC is significantly better than ZM+WF+SPCE for FujiFilm FinePix
J50, as shown in Table 3.7. Due to the reasons we mentioned in Section 3.3, it is
easier to detect the prominent peaks in the spectrum of the reference SPN using
SEA than SPCE, attributing to the better performance of SEA+NCC for FujiFilm
FinePix J50. Furthermore, we can see from the last column of Table 3.6-3.8 that
SPCE can not further improve the performance of the reference SPN filtered by
SEA, or only by a limited amount (for PCAI8). This is due to the fact that the
periodic artifacts have been mostly and effectively suppressed by SEA.
Further investigations with the spectra of the 3 camera models, as illustrated
in Fig. 3.8, may unveil the causes of the difference in performance. Because ZM only
deals with the DC components, the two peaks associated with the diagonal artifacts
reported in [53] are not removable by ZM, as shown in Fig. 3.8(b). The good news
is that the two peaks can be well suppressed by both WF and SEA. However, as
can be seen from Table 3.6, the effect of the suppression is not so significant as
expected because the energy of the peaks only takes up a small proportion of the
overall spectrum energy. For FujiFilm FinePix J50, although WF can effectively
suppress the peaks in the areas with a large local variance, it appears to be helpless
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in suppressing the peaks in the areas with a small local variance. When zooming
in on Fig. 3.8(g), one will find that peaks still exist in the high-frequency band.
Despite the much smaller magnitude of the peaks, the overall spectrum has also
been substantially reduced at the same time, so the suppression is not so effective
as it looks like. This can explain why SEA performs better than ZM+WF for
FujiFilm FinePix J50, as shown in Table 3.7. Although we are still unable to
provide convincing explanations for the poor performance of Casio EX-Z150, as
shown in the last row of Fig. 3.8, the ratio of the energy of low-frequency band to
that of high-frequency band seems much higher than those of the other two cameras
even in the equalized spectrum, suggesting that the true SPN has been seriously
contaminated and making reliable identification difficult. This is probably the reason
why the best performance for Casio EX-150 can be achieved by Li’s Enhancer [3],
which deals with the scene details lying largely in the central area of the spectrum.
Actually the performance on these 3 camera models provides a microcosm of the
overall performance: SEA and ZM+WF are comparable for the reference SPN with
a relatively smooth spectrum, but SEA is better than ZM+WF for the reference
SPNs with a spectrum full of peaks, especially in the high-frequency band. Yet,
there exist some unexpected artifacts that both ZM+WF and SEA cannot cope
with effectively.
3.4.6 Running Time
Finally, the running times of different preprocessing schemes and detection statistics
for different image sizes are listed in Table 3.9. We ran each configuration 1000
times and calculated the average running time. SEA spends extra time on finding
the peaks within local neighborhood in the spectrum, as shown in Procedure 1, so it
is reasonable to see that SEA requires more running time. But it takes less than half
a second even for 1024×1024 pixels sized image blocks and only needs to be applied
once on the reference SPN. In the scenario where only a few candidate cameras are
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Preprocessing
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA
N
C
C
Basic 0.9517 0.9500 0.9467 0.9583
MLE 0.9483 0.9483 0.9467 0.9583
Enhancer 0.9517 0.9517 0.9500 0.9583
Phase 0.9383 0.9317 0.9333 0.9350
BM3D 0.9600 0.9550 0.9550 0.9600
PCAI8 0.9550 0.9533 0.9600 0.9633
S
P
C
E
Basic 0.9500 0.9483 0.9483 0.9583
MLE 0.9500 0.9483 0.9483 0.9583
Enhancer 0.9517 0.9533 0.9500 0.9583
Phase 0.9383 0.9317 0.9333 0.9350
BM3D 0.9550 0.9600 0.9533 0.9600
PCAI8 0.9533 0.9617 0.9583 0.9633
Table 3.6: Kappa statistics for Nikon CoolPix on 256× 256 image blocks
Preprocessing
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA
N
C
C
Basic 0.7733 0.7767 0.7367 0.7933
MLE 0.7700 0.7833 0.7400 0.7967
Enhancer 0.7700 0.7900 0.7633 0.8100
Phase 0.7467 0.7633 0.7567 0.7533
BM3D 0.7267 0.7533 0.7200 0.7567
PCAI8 0.7733 0.7600 0.7700 0.7767
S
P
C
E
Basic 0.7700 0.7900 0.7500 0.7867
MLE 0.7733 0.7867 0.7433 0.7933
Enhancer 0.7833 0.7933 0.7700 0.8033
Phase 0.7500 0.7567 0.7533 0.7533
BM3D 0.7300 0.7600 0.7200 0.7567
PCAI8 0.6867 0.7667 0.7633 0.7833
Table 3.7: Kappa statistics for FujiFilm FinePix J50 on 256× 256 image blocks
involved, the running speed is probably not the biggest concern. In addition, as
can be seen in the last two rows of Table 3.9, NCC is faster than SPCE. So for
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Preprocessing
Original ZM ZM+WF SEA
N
C
C
Basic 0.3333 0.3367 0.3400 0.3400
MLE 0.3333 0.3400 0.3450 0.3383
Enhancer 0.3550 0.3517 0.3550 0.3617
Phase 0.3333 0.3283 0.3217 0.3367
BM3D 0.3300 0.3250 0.3367 0.3333
PCAI8 0.3350 0.3217 0.3300 0.3367
S
P
C
E
Basic 0.3333 0.3383 0.3400 0.3417
MLE 0.3333 0.3433 0.3450 0.3383
Enhancer 0.3567 0.3517 0.3533 0.3617
Phase 0.3333 0.3283 0.3217 0.3367
BM3D 0.3300 0.3267 0.3367 0.3333
PCAI8 0.3367 0.3217 0.3283 0.3383
Table 3.8: Kappa statistics for Casio EX-150 on 256× 256 image blocks
large-scale SCI tasks, the odds of SEA can be evened up by choosing SEA+CNN
rather than ZM+WF+SPCE.
Image sizes (pixels)
1024× 1024 256× 256 64× 64
ZM 39.7 2.5 0.6
ZM+WF 154.2 8.4 1.6
SEA 493.0 55.2 39.5
SPCE 61.5 2.6 0.6
NCC 29.7 1.5 0.1
Table 3.9: Running time comparison (ms)
3.5 Conclusion
We have developed a novel SPN preprocessing approach, namely Spectrum Equal-
ization Algorithm (SEA), for the task of SCI to overcome the limitations of existing
approaches. The spectrum of the reference SPN is equalized by detecting and sup-
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pressing the prominent peaks before calculating the similarity measurement with the
query noise residual. Experimental results on the Dresden image database and our
own database have confirmed the superiority of SEA in terms of both effectiveness
and robustness against JPEG compression for medium and small sized images. We
recognize that although only the task of SCI has been considered in this chapter,
our work can be extended to the task of SPN-based image forgery detection, which
is one of our future lines of investigation. As most existing methods dedicated to
improving the performance of SCI only consider the interference coming from one
particular source, such as the impact of the denoising filter, the periodic artifacts
introduced by CFA interpolation and JPEG compression, the contamination from
scene details, etc., an integrated approach for assembling the existing methods to
provide superior performance is still lacking. It is not a simple and trivial task due
to the possible interference among different methods, so this is another area to be
studied in the future.
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CHAPTER 4
Large-Scale Image Clustering Based on Camera Fingerprint
As discussed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, clustering large-scale device fingerprints is
very challening due to the large-scale and high-dimentional nature of the problem.
The difficulty can be further aggravated by the NC  SC problem. In this chapter,
we propose a novel clustering framework that is capable of addressing the NC  SC
issue without a training process. By reducing the dimensionality of camera finger-
prints and exploiting the inherent sparseness of the pairwise similarity matrix, the
original dataset is partitioned into a number of small batches using a fast graph
clustering algorithm. Fine clustering is then applied on each of the small batches
to produce a collection of sub-clusters, which will be further merged with the aid of
the proposed adaptive thresholding technique. The centroids of the merged clusters
serve as the attractors to attract the unclustered fingerprints to their closest cen-
troids. The above procedures are iteratively repeated until no more notable clusters
can be found. The proposed clustering framework is evaluated on the Dresden im-
age database and compared with the state-of-the-art camera fingerprints clustering
algorithms. Experimental results show that the proposed clustering framework is
much faster than the state-of-the-art algorithms while maintaining a high level of
clustering quality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the following Section
4.1, we will briefly introduce the limitations of existing device fingerprint clustering
algorithms. In Section 4.2, the details of the proposed clustering framework will be
given. Section 4.3 discusses the complexity of the algorithm as well as the parameter
settings . Comprehensive experimental results and analysis will be presented in
Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.1 Introduction
It can be observed in Chapter 2 that existing methods either initially cluster on a
training set randomly sampled from the original dataset [57, 60, 61] or calculate a
small portion of the pairwise similarities [58] to generate a number of representative
clusters, the centroids of which will be used to classify the remaining fingerprints
by assigning each of them to the most similar centroid. The successful classification
requires that the whole dataset is well represented by the representative clusters.
However, sometimes we are confronted with the NC  SC problem, where the
number of classes within the training set is probably less than that of the original
dataset. The NC  SC problem makes it difficult, if not impossible, to form a
training set at random that can sufficiently represent the entire population. In con-
sequence, misclassifications happen when some of the remaining fingerprints do not
belong to any of the representative clusters. Li proposed in [57] that if the similarity
between one fingerprint and the most similar centroid is less than a threshold set by
the user, the fingerprint is treated as a new representative cluster. But not only the
reliability of the new singleton representative cluster is doubtful, but also there is a
probability that one fingerprint does not belong to any of the representative clusters
while its similarity with the closest representative cluster is higher than the preset
threshold. This usually happens when some fingerprints within one representative
cluster are not purely from the same camera. What is worse, such kind of misclas-
sification can be propagated in the succeeding classification process. Therefore, an
effective way of determining an appropriate threshold is urgently needed.
In this chapter, we propose a novel clustering framework capable of dealing
with large-scale camera fingerprint databases. It takes advantage of the dimension
reduction technique and the inherent sparseness of the pairwise similarity matrix
to reduce the computational cost. Based on the analysis of correlation distribution,
we also derive an adaptive threshold with regard to the size and the quality of
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clusters. It is the adaptive threshold that allows the clustering algorithm to work in
a divide-and-conquer manner and makes the clustering on large-scale datasets much
more efficient. Because the noise residue extracted from one image can be viewed
as the noisy version of SPN, unless otherwise stated, we will refer to the true SPN
components in the noise residue as the “true SPN” to distinguish it from the noise
residue, which will be simply referred to as the “camera fingerprint” or “fingerprint”
in the rest of this chapter. Additionally, to differentiate the ground truth and the
clustering results, we refer to the fingerprints of the same camera as a class, while
refer to those clustered into the same group by the clustering algorithm as a cluster.
4.2 Proposed Clustering Framework
Given the limitations of the existing methods reviewed in the previous section, we
propose a new clustering framework as shown in Fig. 4.1. The proposed framework
mainly consists of preparation, coarse clustering, fine clustering, attraction and post-
processing. In what follows, we will look into each of the five steps to provide a rough
picture of the proposed framework.
Step 1: Preparation
• Image preprocessing: Eliminate the images with saturation or low in-
tensities. Rotate the remaining images to ensure they are all horizontally
oriented.
• Fingerprint extraction and standardization: Suppose there are n
images left in the database after removing the dark or saturated images. A
d-dimensional fingerprint is extracted from the center of the green channel
of each image and standardized to zero mean and unit variance.
• Dimension reduction: Project each of the d-dimensional fingerprints
onto a k-dimensional subspace (k < d) using the very sparse random pro-
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jection proposed in [96].
• Fingerprint data storage: Store the full-length fingerprint, the corre-
sponding dimension-reduced fingerprint as well as the image name into a
single file for each image.
Step 2: Coarse clustering
• Correlation matrix approximation: To avoid calculating the n × n
pairwise correlation matrix M , the dimension-reduced fingerprints and the
potential-based eviction (to be discussed in Section 4.2.2) are used to reduce
the computational cost. In this way, M is replaced with a set of more
RAM-efficient lists L, of which each element Li records the indices of the
fingerprints that are similar enough to the ith fingerprint.
• Coarse partition: Based on the graph information recorded in L, the n
fingerprints are coarsely partitioned into nc coarse clusters using the fast
graph clustering algorithm in [97].
Step 3: Fine clustering
• Cluster splitting: For each of the nc coarse clusters, a correlation matrix
is calculated and binarized as in the coarse clustering stage, but using the d-
dimensional full-length fingerprints. Because the size of each coarse cluster
is small, the calculation of the correlation matrix is fast and efficient. Based
on the binary correlation matrix corresponding to one coarse cluster, the
cluster is naturally split into ns sub-clusters with variable sizes using the
flow simulation based graph clustering algorithm [98].
• Cluster merging: Each of the ns sub-clusters is represented by the cen-
troid averaged over the full-length member fingerprints. Based on the ns
centroids, a ns×ns pairwise correlation matrix is calculated and binarized
using an adaptive threshold matrix τ (the element τij depends on the sizes
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and the qualities of sub-cluster Si and sub-cluster Sj). Larger clusters are
therefore obtained by merging two or several sub-clusters. Meanwhile, the
centroids and the qualities of the merged clusters are updated accordingly.
Step 4: Attraction
• Centroid attraction: The centroids are used as “attractors” to attract
the unclustered fingerprints left in the database. Consequently, most of the
fingerprints belonging to the discovered clusters will be absorbed to form
larger clusters.
Step 5: Post-processing
• Cluster screening and storage: Place the fingerprints in the clusters
with a size smaller than a threshold η back into the database and store the
remaining clusters as the final clusters. The stored information includes
the centroid, the names of the corresponding images, and the quality of the
cluster.
• Termination or continuation: The algorithm ends if no more notable
clusters can be found. Otherwise, place the unclustered fingerprints, as well
as those in the clusters with a size smaller than η, back into the database
for the next round of clustering.
In the following subsections, we will provide more details on each of the above
steps.
4.2.1 Preparation
Since the fingerprint information is not present in the dark or saturated images [9],
involving these images into the clustering process not only entails high computa-
tional burden, but also makes the clustering results unreliable and unpredictable.
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Figure 4.1: Flow chart of the proposed framework.
Hence, those images with insufficient fingerprint information will be ignored. An-
other concern comes from the orientation of images. As we know, SPN is pixel-
dependent and images taken by the same camera can be in either the horizontal or
vertical orientation depending on how the camera is held. Inconsistent orientation
will desynchronize the pixel-to-pixel correspondence between images taken by the
same camera. For JPEG/TIFF images, the orientation information may have been
stored in the exchangeable image file format (EXIF) header of the image file, but
the EXIF information is untrustworthy and sometimes unavailable. We therefore
rotate the vertically oriented images clockwise by 90◦ to ensure all images are hor-
izontally oriented. Although this cannot completely solve the rotation problem, it
successfully limits the freedom of rotation.
After the above preprocessing, a camera fingerprint F is extracted from the
central block of the green channel of each image I, i.e.,
F = I − G(I), (4.1)
where G is the denoising filter. The normalized cross correlation (NCC) ρ is used as
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the similarity measurement between two fingerprints, X and Y :
ρ(X,Y ) =
∑d
i=1(X[i]−X)(Y [i]− Y )√∑d
i=1(X[i]−X)2
√∑d
i=1(Y [i]− Y )2
, (4.2)
where d is the length of the fingerprint, X and Y are the arithmetic mean of X
and Y , respectively. NCC is notorious for its high computational cost due to the
calculation of the variances in the denominator of Equation (4.2). To alleviate this,
each fingerprint is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. After stan-
dardization, Equation (4.2) is simplified to the more efficient element-wise product:
ρ(X,Y ) =
1
d
d∑
i=1
Xˆ[i]Yˆ [i], (4.3)
where Xˆ and Yˆ are the standardized version of X and Y , respectively.
Standardization also builds up the equivalence between NCC and other
commonly-used similarity measures such as the inner product1 and the Euclidean
distance [99]. It reminds us that many similarity-preserving dimension reduction
methods are potentially suited for use in reducing the computational cost. Unfor-
tunately, dimension reduction techniques based on the discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) [100], singular value decomposition (SVD) [101], discrete wavelets transform
(DWT) [102] and piecewise aggregate approximation (PAA) [103] are not applicable
to our application due to the nature of noise-like camera fingerprints. More advanced
methods, such as principal components analysis (PCA) [104], isometry mapping
[105], maximal variance unfolding [106] and locally linear embedding [107] are com-
putationally infeasible for large-scale camera fingerprints due to the mutual depen-
dencies of data. We therefore resort to another more efficient solution — very sparse
random projection [96, 108] due to its appealing properties of Euclidean distance-
preserving, computational efficiency and data independence. Let d×n matrix D be
1ρ(X,Y ) = 〈 Xˆ√
d
, Yˆ√
d
〉
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the set of n camera fingerprints in the d-dimensional space Rd, and R be the k × d
random projection matrix with R(i, j)=rij , where {rij |1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ d} are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables drawn from the
following probability distribution:
rij =
√
s
k
×

+1 with probability 1/2s,
0 with probability 1− 1/s,
−1 with probability 1/2s,
(4.4)
where s=
√
d according to [96]. The dimension reduction of the n fingerprints from
Rd to Rk is achieved by a matrix multiplication:
E = RD, (4.5)
where E is a k × n matrix, with its columns representing the dimension-reduced
camera fingerprints.
Finally, the standardized fingerprint, the dimension-reduced counterpart,
along with the image name are stored in a file with an unique filename. The
dimension-reduced and the full-length fingerprint will be used for the following
coarse clustering and fine clustering, respectively.
4.2.2 Coarse clustering
One of the key challenges of clustering large-scale and high-dimensional camera
fingerprints is to discover the potentially correlated fingerprint pairs. Calculating
the complete, exhaustive set of similarities in the n× n pairwise correlation matrix
M requires at least n(n− 1)/2 comparisons, which becomes clearly prohibitive for
large databases. Even if we have the oracle to know all of the entries of M , it is still
an issue to cache them in RAM. Practically speaking, the correlation matrix is very
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likely to be sparse because only the fingerprints of the same camera are correlated
with each other. So instead of keeping all the correlations in the RAM, we use a
threshold tb to binarize the similarities (correlations). Since the intrinsic quality of
fingerprints depends on many complex factors, the average similarities for different
cameras may vary substantially. But in the sense of clustering, one class with a
higher average intra-class similarity should be equivalent to another class with a
lower average similarity. In this regard, binarization is an effective way to eliminate
the divergences in different classes and make the clustering more resilient against
the interferences in the fingerprints.
Another optimization is to calculate a small portion of the n(n−1)/2 matrix
entries, then the key issue becomes what heuristics or criteria can be used to select
the matrix entries for calculation. One such work was proposed in [58], but, as
mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the expensive I/O cost makes it unaffordable for large-
scale databases. Given n dimension-reduced fingerprints, we randomly partition
them into batches of equal size q, where q can be customized so that the RAM is
sufficient for simultaneously accommodating two batches and the extra space for
calculating the inter-batch correlations. Two batches are firstly brought into the
RAM, and the correlations of the fingerprints in the two batches are calculated and
binarized for updating a set of lists L, of which each element Li is a list recording
the indices of the vertices adjacent to the ith fingerprint. All remaining batches are
sequentially loaded from the disk one at a time. To proceed with the next batch, at
least q fingerprints have to be evicted from the RAM. We consider each dimension-
reduced fingerprint as a vertex vi, i = 1, 2, ..., n in a graph G, and define a potential
measurement pi characterizing its potential connectivities with other vertices:
pi =
deg(vi)
Ai
, (4.6)
where deg(vi) is the degree of vertex vi (i.e., the length of Li) and Ai is the accumu-
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lated number of vertices whose connectivities with vertex vi have been investigated
up to the latest batch. pi ∈ [0, 1] is initialized as 0 at the beginning. To accommo-
date the new incoming batch, the q vertices with the lowest potentials are evicted
from the RAM. We refer to this strategy as the potential-based eviction. The un-
derlying motivation is that the more fingerprints a camera fingerprint is connected
with among those that have been investigated, the more likely that it will be con-
nected with more fingerprints among the ones that have not been investigated yet.
By taking advantage of the asymmetry of the class distribution, the potential-based
eviction allows for discovering more correlated fingerprint pairs based on the limited
number of correlation calculations. Meanwhile, the I/O cost is minimized because
every dimension-reduced fingerprint is loaded only once. It is worth noting that we
use pi instead of deg(vi) because the number of pairwise comparisons for the vertices
in the posterior batches is less than that for the vertices in the previous batches.
As a consequence, the vertices loaded earlier tend to have a higher degree than the
ones loaded later.
After obtaining the potentially correlated fingerprint pairs, we aim to roughly
but efficiently partition the database into groups. Many graph partitioning algo-
rithms [97, 109–111] are feasible for the task. In our work, we chose a highly scalable
and open-source2 algorithm, GRACLUS [97], which works by repeatedly coarsening
the original graph (corresponding to L) to a point where very few vertices remain
in the graph, then a spectral clustering method [112] is applied on the coarsest
graph, the clustering result of which will be refined level by level up to the original
graph. By empirically specifying the cluster number nc = dn 14 e, where d·e is a ceil-
ing operator, GRACLUS partitions the n fingerprints into nc coarse clusters with
various sizes, among which some large coarse clusters will be recursively bisected
into small clusters to ensure that each of them can be fit into the RAM at a time.
The purpose of coarse clustering is to gather potentially correlated fingerprints into
2The source code can be downloaded from http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/dml/Software/
graclus.html
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the same batch and therefore increase the probability of forming reliable clusters in
the following fine clustering stage.
4.2.3 Fine clustering
After coarsely partitioning the whole database, the coarse clusters will be further
split and merged in the fine clustering stage. Specifically, for each of the resultant
coarse clusters, an accurate correlation matrix is calculated and binarized as in the
coarse clustering stage, but using the full-length (d-dimensional) rather than the
dimension-reduced (k-dimensional) fingerprints. Because the number of fingerprints
in each coarse cluster is small, the processing of each coarse cluster can be quite
efficient. The binarized correlation matrix is input to the Markov cluster algorithm
(MCL) [98], which iteratively applies the expansion (matrix multiplication) and
inflation (entry-wise matrix product) operators until it converges to a steady state.
Finally, the clusters are discovered by interpreting the resultant matrix. Given
a small enough coarse cluster, many alternative algorithms, such as [57, 58, 60,
61, 113], are feasible for the clustering task. But the following merits make MCL
preferable to other methods:
1. MCL can be significantly sped up by taking advantage of the sparseness of the
correlation matrix and pruning the small matrix entries during each iteration.
2. MCL tends to result in small cluster granularity but high precision rate. Given
a large volume of fingerprints, it is difficult to achieve high recall rate and high
precision rate simultaneously. Mixing the fingerprints of different cameras in
the same cluster (low precision rate) can lead to error propagation in the
ensuing clustering process. However, dispersing the fingerprints of the same
camera into several clusters (low recall rate) still ensures high correctness and
reliability of the clustering despite the extra computational cost. Therefore, if
we have to sacrifice in one aspect to gain in the other, we would usually prefer
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the high precision rate to the high recall rate in practice.
The split of coarse clusters may produce many small or even singleton sub-clusters,
but only the sub-clusters with a score ξ greater than a predefined threshold ts are
collected for further use:
ξ =
√
|C|
∑
vi∈C
∑
vj∈C eij
|C|(|C| − 1) > ts, (4.7)
where |C| is the size of cluster C, eij is a binary variable with 1 signifying that
vi is connected with vj . But due to the limited RAM size, sub-clusters are sorted
according to the score ξ and only the H sub-clusters with the highest scores are
retained in RAM, where H is adaptive to the RAM size. We refer to this strategy
as score sorting. In such a manner, we can make better use of the limited RAM and
guarantee that the larger classes (usually related to the sub-clusters with a higher
score) will be clustered preferentially.
In the coarse clustering stage, the fingerprints of the same camera are likely
to be partitioned into different coarse clusters. Even if those fingerprints are grouped
into the same coarse cluster, they may still be split into different sub-clusters in the
ensuing splitting stage, so it is desirable to merge the sub-clusters of the same camera
for both efficiency and accuracy reasons before proceeding further. Hereafter, we
will refer to the correlation between the centroids of two clusters from the same
camera as the intra-class correlation, and the correlation between the centroids of
two clusters from different cameras as the inter-class correlation. Intuitively, the
intra-class correlation increases with the cluster size because the random noises in
the centroid of a larger cluster have been suppressed more significantly, while the
inter-class correlation remains the same. If we know how the correlation between two
centroids changes with the sizes of clusters, an adaptive threshold can be adopted
to determine whether they are from the same camera. The adaptive thresholding
problem for camera fingerprint clusters merging has been studied in [114] and [115]
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by estimating the parameters of a prescribed function, but both of them do not
generalize well across different cameras. According to the Central Limit Theorem
(CLT), the NCC ρ between two d-dimensional centroids, X and Y , from different
cameras conforms to a normal distribution with zero mean and 1/d variance, i.e.,
ρ(X,Y )∼N (0, 1/d). If X and Y are the centroids of two sub-clusters Sx and Sy
from the same camera, we can derive that the distribution approaches to a normal
distribution when d→∞ (please refer to the Derivation of Correlation Distribution
in the Appendix), i.e.,
ρ(X,Y )
d−→ N (µ,Σ), (4.8)
where 
µ =
√
nxnyσ2xσ
2
y
[(nx−1)σ2x+1][(ny−1)σ2y+1]
Σ =
nxnyσ2xσ
2
y+[(nx−1)σ2x+1][(ny−1)σ2y+1]
[(nx−1)σ2x+1][(ny−1)σ2y+1]d .
(4.9)
Here, d is the length of fingerprints. nx and ny are the sizes (i.e., numbers of member
fingerprints) of cluster Sx and Sy, respectively. σ
2
x and σ
2
y are the average qualities of
the true SPN in each member fingerprint in Sx and Sy. When there is no ambiguity,
the average quality of the true SPN in each member fingerprint of one cluster will
be simply referred to as the quality of the cluster. For large clusters, the mean
of the intra-class distribution is normally far from the zero mean of the inter-class
distribution, so the threshold can be safely increased to reduce the false positives.
An adaptive threshold τ characterizing the change in the intra-class distribution is
therefore proposed as
τ = max
(
tb,
ω
√
nxnyσ2xσ
2
y√
[(nx − 1)σ2x + 1][(ny − 1)σ2y + 1]
)
, (4.10)
where tb is the threshold used for binarizing the similarity matrix in the fine clus-
tering stage, ω is a predefined scaling factor. Two sub-clusters with a correlation
between their centroids higher than τ are considered to be from the same camera.
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In Equation (4.10), τ is related to the dynamic intra-class distribution rather than
the constant inter-class distribution, so it is more reliable than the threshold deter-
mined by the Neyman-Pearson criterion when the cluster size keeps increasing. In
such a way, τ effectively prevents the cluster merging from propagating errors into
the merged clusters. σ2x and σ
2
y in Equation (4.10) can be estimated by calculating
the mean of correlations (please refer to µ1 in Equation (A.6) with λ=1 in the Ap-
pendix). Therefore, when coarse clusters are split into ns sub-clusters, the quality
of each sub-cluster is initially estimated as
σ2i =
1
qi
qi∑
k=1
ρk, i = 1, 2, . . . , ns, (4.11)
where qi is the number of the calculated correlations within Si. Following the
analysis in Scenario 2 in the Appendix, if Sx and Sy are merged into Sˆ in the
cluster merging stage, we update the quality of Sˆ as
σˆ2 =
nxσ
2
x + nyσ
2
y
nx + ny
. (4.12)
In particular, when σ2x=σ
2
y=σ
2, σˆ2 of the merged cluster Sˆ is the same as that
of Sx or Sy, i.e., σˆ
2=σ2. Equation (4.12) can be easily generalized for merging c
sub-clusters:
σˆ2 =
∑c
i=1 niσ
2
i∑c
i=1 ni
, (4.13)
where ni and σ
2
i are the size and the quality of Si, respectively.
4.2.4 Attraction
The following stage is the centroid attraction, where the centroids of the merged
clusters are used as the “attractors” to attract the fingerprints remaining in the
database, so that the fingerprints belonging to the same cluster will be absorbed
into the corresponding attractor. Specifically, one fingerprint F belongs to attractor
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A∗ if
A∗ = argmax
Ai∈A
ρ(Ai,F ), ρ(A
∗,F ) > τρ, (4.14)
where A is the set of attractors and τρ is calculated from Equation (4.10). Finally,
the attracted fingerprints belonging to the same cluster are merged into the cor-
responding cluster and the quality of the merged cluster is updated accordingly.
Suppose an attractor Ax is averaged over nx fingerprints with an average quality
σ2x of the true SPN in each fingerprint, then according to µ in Equation (4.9), the
average quality σ2y of the ny attracted fingerprints can be estimated as
σ2y =
[(nx − 1)σ2x + 1]
∑ny
k=1 ρ
2
k
nxnyσ2x
. (4.15)
The set of fingerprints corresponding to Ax and the set of ny attracted fingerprints
can be viewed as two clusters with a quality of σ2x and σ
2
y , respectively. So according
to Equation (4.12), the quality of the attractor Ax and the number of member
fingerprints are updated as

σ2x ←
n2xσ
4
x + [(nx − 1)σ2x + 1]
∑ny
k=1 ρ
2
k
nx(nx + ny)σ2x
nx ← nx + ny.
(4.16)
4.2.5 Post-processing
Up until now, the clustering process has formed a certain number of clusters, each
of which is presented by a centroid, the names of the corresponding images, and
the quality of the cluster. Notable clusters with a size no smaller than η are stored
as the final clusters. While those clusters with a size less than η, as well as the
remaining unclustered fingerprints, are placed back to the database for the next
round of iteration starting from the coarse clustering stage. Due to the nature
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of the potential-based eviction in the coarse clustering stage and the score sorting
in the fine clustering stage, the classes with a larger size are more likely to form
notable clusters, so the majority of the fingerprints can be clustered in the first
few iterations. During the coarse clustering stage of the next iteration, we put the
unclustered fingerprints from the same batch in the previous iteration into different
batches so as to increase the chance of discovering correlated fingerprint pairs. The
algorithm terminates when no more notable clusters can be discovered.
4.3 Discussion
After presenting the algorithm as above, the reasons why the proposed clustering
framework can cope with large-scale camera fingerprint databases become clear.
By taking advantage of the dimension reduction technique and the sparseness of
the pairwise similarity matrix, the clustering problem of a large database is broken
down into the clustering of several smaller databases with the help of the fast, but
approximate, graph partition algorithm. The adaptive thresholding significantly re-
duces the computational complexity and allows the clustering results of the smaller
databases to be combined to give the solution to the NC  SC problem. The
ability of spotting small classes is conferred by the iterative clustering manner and
the adaptive value of coarse cluster number nc = dn 14 e. On one hand, the itera-
tive manner (thanks to the potential-based eviction and the score sorting strategy)
ensures that most of the larger classes will be clustered in the first few iterations
and the smaller classes will be more focused on in the ensuing iterations. On the
other hand, with the decreasing number of coarse clusters, the probability that more
fingerprints from smaller classes fall into the same coarse cluster increases, making
them more easily to be discovered in the fine clustering stage.
The time complexity of the proposed framework depends on a complex in-
terplay between the number of fingerprints n, the length of the fingerprints, the
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class distribution in the dataset, the number of edges |E|, and the parameter set-
tings. In the coarse clustering stage, it involves nqk multiplications to calculate the
sparse approximate correlation matrix, where q is the size of one batch and k is the
reduced dimension. The fast graph partitioning algorithm GRACLUS [97] approx-
imately has a time complexity O(q|E|/n). In the fine clustering stage, it involves
around nbd multiplications to calculate the accurate correlation matrix, where b is
the average size of the coarse clusters and usually much smaller than q, and d is the
length of the full-length fingerprint. The MCL has a time complexity of O(nK2)
in the worst case [98], where K is the maximal number of nonzero entries in one
column of the binarized correlation matrix. Finally, the attraction stage involves at
most ncdθ multiplications, where θ ∈ (0, 1] is a factor accounting for the percentage
of the c classes that have been discovered. Considering the very high dimension of
the fingerprints, the time complexity O(q|E|/n) of GRACLUS is negligible because
even for an extremely tight and dense graph, O(q|E|/n) = O(nq) is trivial when
compared with the time complexity O(nqk + nbd). So the overall time complexity
of the proposed clustering framework is approximately O(nqk+ nbd+ nK2 + ncdθ)
in one iteration. q and b can be fixed or made adapted to the RAM size, while K,
c and θ depend on the class distribution of the dataset. With regard to the I/O
cost of loading fingerprints from disk, it is O(2nd + nk) in the worst case. At the
first glance, it is about two times as high as the minimal I/O cost O(nd). But given
that one fingerprint needs to be loaded more than once to calculate the pairwise
correlations for large datasets due to the limited size of RAM, O(2nd+ nk) is still
at an acceptable level and a considerable speedup can be expected by using a faster
storage medium, such as Solid State Drive (SSD).
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4.4 Experiments
4.4.1 Experimental setup
The proposed clustering framework was evaluated on the Dresden image database
[53, 91]. After the removal of the dark and saturated images, involved in the exper-
iments are 15, 840 images taken by 74 cameras, covering 27 models and 14 brands.
The number of images taken by each camera varies from 154 to 460. All experiments
were conducted on a PC with windows 7 OS, 3.2 GHz Intel Quad Core Processor, 16
GB RAM and 1 TB Hard Disk Drive (HDD). To alleviate the vignetting effects [94]
and ensure a consistent size for all fingerprints, camera fingerprints were extracted
from the central 1024×1024 block of the green channel of the full resolution images
(i.e., d=1, 048, 576). The method proposed in [1] was used to extract the camera
fingerprints, which were further preprocessed by two operations, zero-meaning (ZM)
and Wiener filtering (WF) in the DFT domain [9], to suppress the non-unique arti-
facts. Note that we did not use the spectrum equalization algorithm (SEA) proposed
in Chapter 3. The reason is that SEA suppresses the periodic artifacts by removing
the peaks in the spectrum. However, unlike in the spectrum of the reference SPN
(i.e., the average of multiple fingerprints), the peaks caused by periodic artifacts are
not conspicuous in the spectrum of a single fingerprint.
The proposed framework is designed for clustering large-scale image database,
but we are also interested in its performance on small datasets. Therefore, based on
the Dresden database, we set up four different small datasets. As we know, images
taken by different devices of the same model undergo the same or similar in-camera
processing procedures, so it is more challenging to correctly cluster the fingerprints
of the devices of the same model. We categorize the clustering difficulties into model-
and device- levels. In the model-level, images in different classes are acquired by de-
vices of different models, while in the device-level, some images are taken by devices
of the same model. Moreover, it is common in practical applications that the num-
95
4.4 Experiments
bers of images captured by different devices vary widely, which results in different
class distributions within the dataset. We, therefore, categorize the distributions of
images in different classes into symmetric and asymmetric. Finally, we set up the
following four datasets for the experiments:
• D1: Model-level symmetric dataset. It consists of 1, 000 images taken by 25
cameras (each responsible for 40 images). The 25 cameras are of different
models and cover nearly all of the popular camera brands, such as Canon,
Nikon, Olympus, Pentax, Samsung and Sony.
• D2: Model-level asymmetric dataset. 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60 images were alter-
natively chosen from the images taken by the same 25 cameras as in D1.
• D3: Device-level symmetric dataset. It consists of 1, 000 images taken by
50 cameras (each responsible for 20 images). The 50 cameras only cover 12
popular models, so some of them are from the same model.
• D4: Device-level asymmetric dataset. 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 images were
alternatively chosen from the images taken by the same 50 cameras as in D3.
Notice that the size of each dataset was fixed to 1, 000, while the number of classes,
as well as the ratio of the number of classes to the average size of classes, was
raised in D3 and D4. These four datasets will be used for investigating parameters,
evaluating the capability of the proposed framework in conquering the NC  SC
problem, and comparing the performances of different clustering algorithms on small
datasets. The results on the entire Dresden database can be found in the last part
of Section 4.4.3.
The quality of clustering is characterized in terms of the F1-measure
F = 2 · P · RP +R , (4.17)
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where the average precision rate P and the average recall rate R are calculated as

P =
∑
i |oi|∑
i |ci|
R =
∑
i |oi|∑
i |ψi|
,
(4.18)
where |ci| is the size of cluster ci, |ψi| is the size of the most frequent class ψi in
cluster ci, and |oi| is the size of the overlap between cluster ci and class ψi.
4.4.2 Parameter settings
There are a few parameters that need to be set for our proposed framework. We
will investigate the impact of these parameters on performance and discuss how to
determine the appropriate parameter settings.
The first parameter is the dimension k of the subspace of random projection.
As remarked in [96], we can apply, with a high level of accuracy, the results of con-
ventional random projection, i.e., the i.i.d. entries of R are drawn from the standard
normal distribution N (0, 1), to very sparse random projection. For example, we can
determine the minimum k that achieves an embedding error  in pairwise correlation
preservation using Theorem 4 3 in [116]. But this gives a very conservative estima-
tion of the minimum k. We drew the distributions of  for different k using the
camera fingerprints in dataset D1 (n = 1, 000) and D3 (n = 1, 000), as shown in Fig.
4.2(a) and Fig. 4.2(b), respectively. According to Theorem 4 in [116], if we want
to preserve 80% of the pairwise correlations with an error less than  = 0.005 for a
dataset consisting of n = 1, 000 points, the required minimum k has to be higher
than 2.8 × 106. But as can be seen in Fig. 4.2, the same level of accuracy can be
achieved using k = 65, 536, which is used in all of our experiments.
The second parameter is the binarization threshold tb. For binarizing the
accurate correlation matrix in the fine clustering stage, we set tb = 0.005 to give a
3It states that let Q be a set of n unit-normal points in Rd and R be a random matrix with i.i.d.
entries drawn from N (0, 1). Then for all u,v ∈ Q, Pr(|〈u,v〉 − 〈Ru,Rv〉| ≥ ) ≤ n2e(2−(2−3) k4 ).
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Figure 4.2: Probability density functions of the embedding error  in pairwise
correlations of D1 (a) and D3 (b).
theoretical false positive rate Q(d ∗ tb) ≈ 1.5× 10−7, where Q is the complementary
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). However,
the actual false positive rate can be much higher due to the presence of non-unique
artifacts. To see this, we obtained the ROC curves by varying a threshold from −1
to 1 and comparing it with the pairwise correlations of camera fingerprints in D1
and D3, as shown in Fig. 4.3(a) and Fig. 4.3(b), respectively. The false positive rate
is approximately 1 × 10−4 for the model-level dataset D1 and can be even higher
for the device-level dataset D3. To compensate for the errors introduced by random
projection, we increased tb to 0.008 for binarizing the entries of the approximate
correlation matrix in the coarse clustering stage. As shown in Fig. 4.3, tb = 0.008
gives a false positive rate around 2.5×10−2. Note that the much larger false positive
rate in the coarse clustering does not necessarily result in a low precision rate of
the final clustering result, because the coarse clustering is followed by the accurate
fine clustering. To give a practical reference, the curves corresponding to thresholds
in [0.004, 0.006] for the original fingerprint and thresholds in [0.006, 0.01] for the
dimension-reduced fingerprint are highlighted in yellow.
The third parameter is the scaling factor ω of the adaptive threshold τ in
Equation (4.10). It actually determines a point that lies between the means of intra-
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Figure 4.3: ROC curves obtained by varying a threshold from −1 to 1 and
comparing it to the pairwise correlations of camera fingerprints in dataset D1 (a)
and D3 (b).
class and inter-class distributions. To see how ω affects the clustering results, we
conduct experiments on dataset D1. As shown in Fig. 4.4(a), a high ω reduces
the false attribution error, and therefore gives rise to the precision rate. But the
drawback of a high ω is that it produces many small clusters with a size less than
η, which excludes a large amount of images from the final results. As can be seen in
Fig. 4.4(b), the number of clustered images (i.e., the images in clusters with a size
larger than η) decreases as ω goes up. We found that an ω in the range of [0.3, 0.5]
strikes a good balance between the performance and the number of clustered images.
ω is set to 0.45 in our experiments.
The fourth parameter is the score threshold ts in Equation (4.7). Only the
sub-clusters with a score larger than ts are collected for further use in the merge and
attraction stages. Since the score ξ is a function of the cluster size, ts is therefore
closely related with the minimal cluster size η. The effect of these two parameters
on the performance will be investigated jointly. As could be expected, these two
parameters are more sensitive to datasets with small average class size. Therefore,
we clustered the challenging dataset D3 (with a small average class size of 20) using
different combinations of ts ∈ [1, 3] and η ∈ [2, 10]. As can be seen in Fig. 4.5, the
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Figure 4.4: Impact of ω on (a) the clustering performance and (b) the number of
images included in the final results.
larger ts, the better clustering performance. But the trade-off is that a higher ts
makes small sub-clusters less likely to be collected for further investigation, which
limits the capability of discovering small classes and excludes the majority of the
images in the final results, as can be seen in Fig. 4.5(d). ts is therefore set to
√
2 in our experiments to ensure a good capability of discovering small classes. If
applicable, η can be set according to the prior information, such as the average class
size, of the dataset. Otherwise, it is advised to set it to a value that is large enough
for constructing a reliable cluster centroid. We set η = 5 in our experiments.
4.4.3 Analyses
We conduct a series of experiments to investigate: 1) the superiority of the potential-
based eviction over the random eviction, 2) the effectiveness of the adaptive thresh-
old τ , 3) the capability of conquering the NC  SC problem, and 4) the comparison
with other clustering algorithms on both small and large-scale datasets.
Superiority of the potential-based eviction
To demonstrate the advantages of the potential-based eviction (please refer to Equa-
tion (4.6)), we compared it with the random eviction, which is exactly the same as
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Figure 4.5: How the score threshold ts and the size η of the minimal cluster affect
the clustering results. (a) Precision rates. (b) Recall rates. (c) F1-Measures. (d)
Number of clustered images.
the potential-based eviction except that all fingerprints in the previous batch, rather
than those with lower potentials, will be evicted from RAM before loading the next
batch. Suppose n = 5, 000 fingerprints were equally divided into 10 batches (batch
size q = 500), which will be sequentially loaded into RAM. Two synthetic experi-
ments were conducted: in the first experiment, the class number c was fixed to 20 to
simulate the scenario where the NC  SC problem is absent. 1, 000 class distribu-
tions were randomly generated under the constraint that the sum of the class sizes
equals 5, 000. Based on the limited correlation calculations and I/O operations, a
good eviction strategy can well explore the connectivity information of the graph
consisting of fingerprints. Therefore, we used Rd, defined as the ratio of the number
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of discovered edges to the total number of edges of the fingerprint graph, to mea-
sure the effectiveness of eviction strategies. Since the entropy is a good indicator
of the symmetry of one distribution, we used the ratio of the entropy of the class
distribution to that of the uniform distribution as the symmetry measurement Ms.
Specifically,
Ms =
−1
n log2 c
c∑
i=1
ni log2
ni
n
, (4.19)
where ni is the number of fingerprints in the ith class, n is the total number of
fingerprints, and c is the number of classes. The higher the Ms, the more symmetric
the distribution, with 1 indicating the uniform distribution. In the second exper-
iment, the same procedure was repeated with a different c = 500 to simulate the
scenario where the number of classes is higher than the average class size (i.e., the
NC  SC problem is present).
Results of the two experiments are shown in Fig. 4.6(a) and 4.6(b), respec-
tively. As can be seen, Rd of the random eviction stays around the theoretical
value (3nq − 2q2 − n)/(n2 − n) ≈ 0.28, while Rd of the potential-based eviction
are consistently higher than those of the random eviction. As Ms decreases, the
class distribution becomes more unbalanced and the fingerprints from larger classes
tend to have higher potentials. As a result, the edges connecting the fingerprints
from larger classes are more likely to be discovered. Therefore, the advantage of
the potential-based eviction grows as Ms decreases, as more clearly shown in Fig.
4.6(b).
Effectiveness of the adaptive threshold
To investigate the effectiveness of the adaptive threshold τ in Equation (4.10), we
randomly chose 900 images taken by three cameras (each responsible for 300 images),
namely one Agfa DC-830i (referred as Cam 1 ) and two Kodak M1063s (referred as
Cam 2 and Cam 3 ), to simulate the inter-class and intra-class correlation distribu-
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Figure 4.6: Superiority of the potential-based eviction over the random eviction.
(a) c = 20. (b) c = 500.
tions. Three sets of values of nx and ny, i.e., (nx = 1, ny = 10), (nx = 10, ny = 30)
and (nx = 30, ny = 50), were tested. We first excluded the 300 images acquired
by Cam 3 to simulate the case that two cameras are of different models. The
NCC ρ between two centroids averaged over nx and ny camera fingerprints, which
were randomly selected from the 300 images of Cam 1 and the other 300 images of
Cam 2, respectively, was calculated as one inter-class correlation. To prevent the
same fingerprint from contributing to both centroids, the 300 images of Cam 2 were
equally divided into two groups. nx and ny images were randomly selected from
the two groups and the correlation ρ between the corresponding two centroids was
calculated as one intra-class correlation. As indicated in Equation (4.11), σ2x and
σ2y were estimated from the pairwise correlations of the camera fingerprints that
were used to estimate the two centroids, respectively. We repeated the above pro-
cedure 2, 000 times to generate 2, 000 inter-class correlations and 2, 000 intra-class
correlations, which were used to draw the inter-class distribution and intra-class
distribution, respectively. To simulate the case where two cameras are of the same
model, we replaced the images of Cam 1 with those of Cam 3 and repeated the
above procedure again. Comparison with the other two adaptive thresholds pro-
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posed in [114] and [115] were also performed. For the threshold proposed in [114],
we set n = max(nx, ny) to make it applicable to more general cases.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the effectiveness of thresholds. The first and second
rows show the results for two cases, i.e., cameras are of different models or the
same model, respectively. From left to right, the columns show the results for four
sets of values, i.e., (nx = 1, ny = 10), (nx = 10, ny = 30) and (nx = 30, ny = 50),
respectively.
As illustrated in the first row of Fig. 4.7, the inter-class distribution remains
unchanged with regard to the increasing nx and ny, while the intra-class distribution
keeps shifting towards the right. The threshold proposed in [114] seems to be working
well for large n, but closer inspection reveals that it almost stays the same with
regard to the increasing n. As a consequence, it is either too conservative for large n
or overly aggressive for small n. Although the threshold proposed in [115] also shifts
to the right, its shift is too aggressively, making some of the intra-class correlations
misclassified as inter-class correlations. In fact, the unsatisfactory performance of
the thresholds in [114] and [115] is to be expected because they only consider the
number of fingerprints and ignore the fact that the correlation also heavily depends
on the quality of fingerprints. That is the key reason why the threshold τ in Equation
(4.10) is capable of adaptively finding a suitable breaking point between the inter-
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class distribution and the intra-class distribution.
Similar results can be observed in the second row of Fig. 4.7, but the inter-
class distribution moves to the right as nx and ny increase due to the non-unique
artifacts shared by devices of the same model. What is worse, in practice it is
possible that the fingerprints used to calculate the centroid are not solely from the
same class due to the potential errors, which probably lengthens the right tail of
the inter-class distribution and the left tail of the intra-class distribution. These
two phenomenons make the two distributions more likely to overlap and therefore
complicate the situation. A threshold indicated in Equation (4.10) approximately
divides the margin evenly between the inter-class distribution and the intra-class
distribution, so it can be expected to deliver a good performance in practice.
Capability of conquering the NC  SC problem
To simulate the NC  SC problem, we cropped 50 image blocks sized 1024× 1024
at 50 different locations from each image in D1, D2, D3 and D4. Since the SPN
is location-based, such a simple and efficient way of image cropping simulates the
process of generating images acquired by different sensors. For example, cropping
50 image blocks at different locations from each of the 40 images taken by one
camera results in 2, 000 image blocks taken by 50 cameras (each accounting for 40
image blocks). Notice that the images blocks cropped from the same image undergo
the same in-camera processing procedures, which possibly introduces non-unique
artifacts and therefore makes the clustering task on the generated datasets even
more challenging. The datasets generated from D1, D2, D3 and D4 are referred to
as D′1, D′2, D′3 and D′4, respectively, each of which consists of 50, 000 image blocks.
The clustering results are presented in Table 4.1, where ng is the ground-truth
class number, nd is the number of the discovered unique classes with a size no smaller
than η in the final clustering results, and the remaining columns show the numbers
of the discovered unique classes in each iteration. As can be seen, the clustering is
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Dataset ng nd
Iteration
1 2 3 4 5
D′1 1, 250 1, 145 586 445 253 58 −
D′2 1, 250 1, 157 601 451 216 67 −
D′3 2, 500 1, 982 637 532 606 304 108
D′4 2, 500 1, 912 638 529 568 279 146
Table 4.1: Clustering results on the generated datasets
finished in a few iterations and the number of the discovered unique classes decreases
significantly after the first few iterations. For the model-level datasets D′1 and D′2,
about 92%∼93% of the classes can be discovered and the clustering can be finished in
less iterations. But for the two more challenging datasets D′3 and D′4, only 76%∼79%
of the classes are discovered mainly due to the small classes in them. Certainly, the
number of the discovered unique classes can be increased by specifying a smaller
η, but given the results in the first column of Fig. 4.7, if the cluster size is small,
it is more likely that the two distributions are overlapped, which gives rise to false
positives or false negatives even an appropriate threshold is chosen. Therefore, if the
discovered clusters are about to be used for further merging or query (e.g., retrieving
the similar clusters for the new incoming fingerprints), it is advisable to specify a
reasonable high η so as to improve the reliability of the system. So it is important to
investigate the performance of the proposed framework when η is set to a relatively
high value.
Further investigations reveal that at least three reasons account for the dif-
ficulties of discovering small classes:
(a) Although the images are rotated to ensure the same horizontal orientation,
they may still be incorrectly rotated (e.g., supposed to be rotated clockwise
but rotated anti-clockwise). As a result, images from the same class are split
into two classes, making small classes even more difficult to be identified.
(b) A threshold tb is specified to binarize the correlations. To achieve high pre-
106
4.4 Experiments
cision rate of the clusters, tb should be large enough. But the side effect is
that some fingerprints of the same class will be considered as unrelated due to
the insufficiently large correlations, which has a more severe impact on small
classes due to the limited number of intra-class correlations.
(c) Smaller classes are more sensitive to misclassification. Considering two classes,
one consisting of five fingerprints and the other consisting of ten fingerprints,
if four fingerprints in both the first class and the second class are wrongly
classified, the first class will disappear from the final clustering results, while
there is still a chance to form clusters for the second class.
It is the interplay of these reasons that makes discovering small classes in large-scale
databases very challenging. Considering the fact that the size of classes in D′3 and
D′4 can be as small as 10 or 20, and η is set to a relatively high value 5, 76%∼79%
is a very promising result.
Comparison with other clustering algorithms
In this section, we will compare the proposed clustering framework with other cam-
era fingerprints clustering algorithms. Apart from P, R and F as explained in
Equations (4.17) and (4.18), we will also show the ratio of the number of discovered
unique clusters to the ground-truth class number, i.e., nd/ng. It was observed in our
experiments that the algorithm in [61] performs better and slightly faster than that
in [60], so we will use [61] to represent the hierarchical clustering based algorithms.
For the sake of convenience, we refer to Li’s Markov random field based algorithm
[57] as MRF, Liu’s multi-class spectral clustering based algorithm [58] as SC, and
Villalba’s hierarchical clustering based algorithm [61] as HC. It is worth mention-
ing that 1/5 of the entire dataset is used as the membership committee in the first
iteration of MRF to reduce the computational cost. For the proposed algorithm,
the whole dataset is randomly partitioned into batches of equal size in the coarse
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Quality
Clustering algorithms
MRF [57] SC [58] HC [61] Proposed
P 0.9756 0.2367 0.5080 0.9980
R 0.8205 0.9833 0.8467 0.7320
F 0.8914 0.3816 0.6350 0.8442
nd/ng 25/25 6/25 13/25 25/25
a
Quality
Clustering algorithms
MRF [57] SC [58] HC [61] Proposed
P 0.9533 0.2605 0.5577 0.9879
R 0.8500 1.0000 0.8424 0.7382
F 0.8987 0.4134 0.6711 0.8446
nd/ng 25/25 5/25 15/25 25/25
b
Quality
Clustering algorithms
MRF [57] SC [58] HC [61] Proposed
P 0.8099 0.0600 0.8262 0.9940
R 0.7538 1.0000 0.6681 0.6023
F 0.7809 0.1132 0.7388 0.7499
nd/ng 42/50 3/50 45/50 43.3/50
c
Quality
Clustering algorithms
MRF [57] SC [58] HC [61] Proposed
P 0.7027 0.0301 0.9478 0.9941
R 0.7942 1.0000 0.7236 0.6853
F 0.7456 0.0584 0.8207 0.8111
nd/ng 31/50 1/50 46/50 42.2/50
d
Table 4.2: Comparison of 4 different clustering algorithms on 4 different datasets:
(a) D1, (b) D2, (c) D3, and (d) D4.
clustering stage, so as to give convincing results, we repeated the experiments 10
times and showed the average results for the proposed algorithm.
In the first experiment, four clustering algorithms were tested on the four
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fixed-size small datasets, namely D1, D2, D3 and D4. Results are shown in Table
4.2, where the highest value in each row is highlighted in bold. As can be seen,
SC performs worst among the four algorithms in terms of the F1-measure. The
underlying reasons is that SC terminates when the size of the smallest cluster equals
1. Due to the intrinsic characteristics of the fingerprint, if one camera fingerprint is
severely contaminated, it can easily be regarded as unrelated to all other fingerprints
and result in a singleton cluster. Such premature termination happens more often
when the size of class is small. As a consequence, the number of unique clusters nd
discovered by SC is significantly lower than that of the other three algorithms. MRF
has the best performance on the model-level datasets, but its performance degrades
on the device-level datasets, where the fingerprints of the cameras of the same model
are more ambiguous and misleading for the clustering algorithm. Surprisingly, HC
performs worse on the model-level datasets than on the device-level datasets. We
looked into the clusters generated on the two model-level datasets and found that
there are several large clusters containing the fingerprints from several cameras. So
the rather contradictory results are caused by the incorrect agglomeration at an
earlier stage, which will mislead and spoil the succeeding agglomerations. For the
proposed clustering algorithm, the overall performance is balanced and stable across
different datasets. The precision rate of the proposed algorithm keeps staying at
98%∼100% at the expense of a slightly lower recall rate, around 61%∼73%. This
consequently retains the F1-measure of the proposed algorithm at a favorable level.
But because of the reasons mentioned in Section 4.4.3, some classes in D3 and D4
are missing in the final results.
In the second experiment, we compare the time complexities and the clus-
tering qualities of the four algorithms on various-size datasets. To generate datasets
of various sizes, we incrementally added 1, 000 images captured by 10 cameras (100
images per camera) to an empty dataset until all the 74 cameras in the Dresden
database had been covered. The four algorithms were run and evaluated on each of
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these datasets. For the sake of completeness, we also evaluated the algorithms on
the whole Dresden database, i.e., 15, 840 images.
The running time (in seconds) is shown in Fig. 4.8(a). Since MRF, SC and
HC require the calculation of pairwise correlations before clustering, the time used to
load fingerprints from the disk and calculate the pairwise correlations is highlighted
in green in the stacked bar. For the proposed clustering framework, the time used
to load the projection matrix and calculate random projection is highlighted in pink
in the stacked bar. What can be observed in Fig. 4.8(a) is that MRF is most
time-consuming, followed by HC and SC. One interesting observation comes from
MRF, for which the running time significantly increases by almost 100% when the
image number slightly increases from 7, 000 to 7, 400. It was found that the required
iteration number for the algorithm to converge becomes much higher for the slightly
larger dataset, so the running time of MRF not only depends on the size but also
the characteristics of the dataset, such as the quality of fingerprint and the class
distribution. By applying the dimension reduction technique and the divide-and-
conquer strategy, the running time of the proposed clustering framework is much
lower than those of all the other three algorithms. For example, it only requires
about 45 minutes to cluster the whole Dresden database on our ordinary desktop
machine.
The precision rates, recall rates, F1-measures, and the ratios nd/ng are il-
lustrated in Fig. 4.8(b), 4.8(c), 4.8(d), and 4.8(e), respectively. Compared with the
results given in Table 4.2, the performance of SC becomes better on the datasets
containing large classes, because with more fingerprints in each class, it has a lower
chance to trigger the premature termination. But compared with the other three
algorithms, SC is still the worst algorithm and far from satisfactory. MRF is quite
stable in terms of the recall rate, but the precision rate witnesses a remarkable and
steady decrease as the image number increases, making it unsuitable for large-scale
databases. For HC, both the number of discovered unique clusters and the precision
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Figure 4.8: Running times and clustering qualities of different clustering
algorithms on datasets with various sizes. (a) Running time (in seconds). (b)
Precision rates. (c) Recall rates. (d) F1-Measures. (e) nd/ng.
rate stay at a high level, but its low recall rate indicates that it tends to produce
small-size clusters. Moreover, the sudden increase of the precision rate of HC also
indicates its instability across different datasets. While for the proposed algorithm,
as the size of dataset increases, it not only achieves high and stable performance,
but also discovers all the classes in the database. The high precision rate and the
good capability of discovering classes makes the proposed algorithm attractive in
many practical scenarios.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel clustering framework, without a training process, has been
developed to address the NC  SC problem commonly encountered when clus-
111
4.5 Conclusion
tering large-scale images based on camera fingerprint. By continually updating the
qualities of clusters and applying the adaptive thresholding, the proposed frame-
work works in a divide-and-conquer manner, and thus can be adopted to large-scale
camera fingerprint databases. In comparison with the state-of-the-art camera fin-
gerprints clustering algorithms, the proposed algorithm is much faster and delivers
good clustering quality, especially for large databases. The high precision rate makes
the proposed framework attractive in many practical applications such as informa-
tion searching and retrieval. However, given the results in Table 4.1 and 4.2, some
small classes cannot be discovered by the proposed algorithm due to the improper
binarization and the potential misclassification errors. In fact, because of the na-
ture of the noise-like camera fingerprints, it is hard to solve this issue especially in
large-scale databases and further studies are needed to work around it. Another line
of our future work will be the parallelization of the proposed framework. Different
stages of the proposed framework, such as the calculation of the approximate corre-
lation matrix, the fine clustering of the coarse clusters, and the centroid attraction
can be processed in parallel. We believe that our research will serve as the effective
tool for clustering large-scale camera fingerprints.
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CHAPTER 5
Refining SPN-Based Image Forgery Detection
Sensor pattern noise (SPN) can be considered as a spread-spectrum watermark
embedded in every image taken by the source imaging device. It has been effectively
used for localizing forgeries in digital images. The noise residual extracted from the
image in question is compared with the reference SPN in a block-wise manner. If
their normalized cross correlation, which servers as a decision statistic, is below a
pre-determined threshold (e.g., by the Neyman-Pearson criterion), the center pixel
of the window is declared as forged. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the
decision statistic is calculated over the forged and the non-forged regions when the
detection block falls near the boundary of the two different regions. As a result, the
pixels of the forged region near the boundary area are likely to be wrongly identified
as genuine ones. To alleviate this problem, in this chapter, we propose an algorithm
to refine the initial detection result along the boundary. We analyze the correlation
distribution in the problematic region and refine the detection by weighting the
decision threshold based on the altered correlation distribution. The effectiveness
of the proposed refining algorithm is validated through the detection results on
simulated image forgeries and three different kinds of realistic image forgeries.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we will
revisit the constant false acceptance rate (CFAR) method. In Section 5.2, we will
introduce the missing detection problem arising from the CFAR method. Section 5.3
presents the proposed algorithm and Section 5.4 validates the proposed algorithm by
detecting both simulated and realistic image forgeries. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes
this chapter.
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5.1 Background
Detecting image forgeries is an interesting while very challenging task due to the
variety of image manipulations a user can perform with increasingly powerful image
editing softwares. As mentioned in Chapter 1, active techniques, such as digital
watermarking, are effective in verifying the authenticity of an image, but the re-
quirement of originally embedding into the protected image limits their widespread
use in practice. Therefore, there has been growing interest in passive techniques. As
one of the most promising passive techniques, SPN has been proven to be a powerful
and robust tool for exposing image forgery [6, 8, 9, 72, 75, 117]. Its capability of
detecting image forgeries irrespective of the specific type of forgery arouses wide
attention of the researchers in the field of digital image forensics. In [9], an image
forgery detection technique based on SPN was proposed. In what follows, we will
revisit this algorithm in detail and explain how the missing problem arises from the
constant false acceptance rate (CFAR) criterion it applies.
Like in [9], we formulate the problem of detecting SPN signal in noise residual
w as a binary hypothesis test

h0 : w = v
h1 : w = r + v,
(5.1)
where r is the signal of interest (i.e., the reference SPN) and v is the SPN-irrelevant
noise. If an image region has been tampered with, the SPN signal in noise residual
w of that region is lost. Therefore, image forgeries can be exposed by identifying
the image regions where the SPN signal is absent. Since SPN, by its very nature, is
a very weak noise-like signal, its reliable detection requires jointly processing a large
number of pixel samples, typically in a block-wise manner. For a target pixel qi, a
decision statistic ρi is calculated based on the normalized cross correlation (NCC)
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between wNi and rNi :
ρi =
∑
j∈Ni (wj − w¯)(rj − r¯)√∑
j∈Ni (wj − w¯)2
√∑
j∈Ni(rj − r¯)2
, (5.2)
where Ni is the pixel indices within a n × n sliding detection block centered at qi.
To reveal the forgery, ρi is then compared with a threshold γ:
uˆi =

1, ρi < γ
0, otherwise
(5.3)
where uˆi ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value indicating the forgery (1 for forgery and 0 for
genuine pixel). γ is usually selected according to the Neyman-Person criterion to
ensure a small false acceptance rate (FAR), i.e., Pr(uˆi = 0|ui = 1), with ui ∈ {0, 1}
the ground truth. However, even for the non-forged pixels, the NCC coefficients
might happen to be very low in the image areas of dark, saturated or highly tex-
tured. Based on the correlation predictor proposed in [9] (please refer to Section
2.3.2 for more details), this problem is addressed by predicting the correlation dis-
tribution p(x|h1) and correcting the tampered pixels for which the false rejection
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Figure 5.1: How to determine the thresholds for given inter-camera and intra-camera
correlation distributions.
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rate (misidentifying non-tampered as tampered) higher than a threshold θ, i.e.,
∫ γ
−∞
p(x|h1)dx > θ, (5.4)
to non-tampered. Fig. 5.1 shows how to determine the thresholds γ and θ when
p(x|h0) and p(x|h1) are given.
We would like to spend more words on the estimation of the correlation dis-
tribution under hypothesis h0 and h1 (i.e., p(x|h0) and p(x|h1)). It was observed in
our experiments that if the reference SPN r, is preprocessed by the Wiener Filtering
in DFT domain (WF) [9] or our recently proposed spectrum equalization algorithm
(SEA) [118], p(x|h0) fits quite well with the Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/d), where
d = n × n is the number of pixels within the square detection block. One example
for d = 128×128 is shown in Fig. 5.2, where p(x|h0) is estimated using 19200 im-
age blocks cropped from images taken by other cameras, and p(x|h1) is estimated
using 15360 image blocks cropped from images taken by the same camera. For the
estimation of p(x|h1), we use a Gaussian model rather than the generalized Gaus-
sian model in [9] due to its simplicity. With the help of the correlation predictor
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Figure 5.2: How preprocessing affects the correlation distribution p(x|h0) and
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Figure 5.3: Predicted correlations obtained with the correlation predictor proposed
in [9] using 20480 image blocks of size d = 128× 128 pixels for (a) a Canon IXY500
and (b) a Canon IXUS 850IS.
described in Section 2.3.2, the mean and the variance of the Gaussian distribution
are the predicted correlation and the variance of prediction errors, respectively. To
see how well the correlation predictor performs, we showed the predicted and actual
correlations for two cameras, a Canon IXY500 and a Canon IXUS 850IS, in Fig.
5.3(a) and 5.3(b), respectively. As can be seen, most of the points scatter along
the line y = x, which means the predicted correlations agree well with the actual
correlations. However, we have two remarks to make for the correlation predictor:
1. As illustrated in Fig. 5.3(a), the variance at the low end tends to be smaller
than that at the high end. The lower variance is not due to the insufficient
image blocks with correlations at the low end, because the correlations lower
than 0.05 takes up more than 1/3 of the entire population. The result shown
in Fig. 5.3(a) indicates that the prediction error given by the correlation
predictor does depend on the predicted correlation, which is opposite to the
conclusion in [9].
2. In Fig. 5.3(b), there are a small number of outliers lying along the line corre-
sponding to the actual correlation ρ = 0. Further investigation reveals that the
outliers result from the image blocks with low intensities or saturation. These
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outliers are also responsible for the inaccurate variance estimation for p(x|h1),
because the variance is calculated over the entire population of training data.
5.2 Missing Detection Problem
The algorithm proposed in [9] applies the constant false acceptance rate (CFAR)
(i.e., misidentifying a tampered block as non-tampered) method to determine a fixed
threshold. However, as pointed out in [75, 117], when the detection block falls near
the boundary of the tampered and the non-tampered regions, the decision statistic
becomes a weighted average of two different contributions and may lead to a high
false acceptance rate (FAR), as illustrated in Fig. 5.5. This problem can be allevi-
ated by means of hard [117] or soft [75] image segmentation to obtain the boundary
information before detection. These two algorithms share the same essence of mak-
ing use of the extra structure information of the image content, but their drawbacks
are twofold: Firstly, the detection result heavily depends on the quality of image
segmentation or the pilot image [76], but an accurate image segmentation or high-
quality pilot image is not easy to obtain. The second and most critical drawback
is that they are incapable of detecting the occlusive forgery, where objects in the
original scene are hidden by placing a homogeneous background on them, or the
image forgeries based on image inpainting [119, 120] or texture synthesis [121–123].
One example of image inpainting is shown in Fig. 5.4(b), where there is no structure
information in the forged area that can be used for image segmentation.
5.3 Proposed Method
The proposed algorithm aims at improving the resolution of SPN-based image
forgery detection. But unlike the algorithms based on image segmentation, it ap-
proaches the missing detection problem from a different perspective. Starting from
an initial detection, we model how the decision statistic changes as the detection
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: An example of image inpainting. (a) Original image (b) Forged image.
block moves across the boundary of two different regions (i.e., tampered and non-
tampered) and adjust the decision threshold accordingly to achieve a more satis-
factory detection. We assume that the d-dimensional signal within the detection
block, either for the estimated rNi or wNi , is standardized to have zero mean and
unit variance, which means each element, rj or wj (j ∈ Ni), is independently drawn
from the identical normal distribution N (0, 1). Presumably, each element in the
standardized signal can be modeled as the sum of the true SPN signal and other
irrelevant interferences: 
wj = xj + αj
rj = yj + βj ,
(5.5)
where xj follows a Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2) and αj conforms to N (0, 1− σ2).
Likewise, yj ∼ N (0, λσ2) and βj ∼ N (0, 1−λσ2). Here, σ2 and λσ2 can be viewed as
the quality of the true SPN signal in wNi and rNi , respectively. Note that λ accounts
for the different qualities of the SPN signal in wNi and rNi . With the standardized
signal, the decision statistic ρi in Equation (5.2) is simplified as
ρi =
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
(xjyj + αjyj + βjxj + αjβj). (5.6)
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If x and y are from two different cameras (i.e., under hypothesis h0), using the
Central Limit Theorem (CLT), ρi follows a Gaussian distribution N (µh0 , σ2h0), where
µh0 = 0 and σ
2
h0
= 1/d. While under hypothesis h1, we have yi =
√
λxi. Therefore,
Equation (5.6) can be rewritten as
ρi =
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
(
√
λx2j +
√
λαjxj + βjxj + αjβj). (5.7)
It is known that x2j/σ
2 follows the Chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom,
χ2(1). So based on the assumption that xj , αj and βj are mutually independent,
we can easily arrive at
ρi ∼ N (µh1 , σ2h1), (5.8)
where 
µh1 =
√
λσ2
σ2h1 = (1 + λσ
4)/d.
(5.9)
Figure 5.5: The square detection block across the non-tampered region Ω
h1
i and the
tampered region Ω
h0
i .
Equation (5.8) is the decision statistic distribution if the detection block
falls completely on the non-tampered region. To see how the problematic region
is incompatible with the distribution, let us look at Fig. 5.5, which shows a de-
tection block sliding across the non-tampered region the tampered region Ω
h0
i (in
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yellow background) and Ω
h1
i (in green background). The decision statistic therefore
becomes a weighted average of two different contributions:
ρi =
1
n
h0
i
∑
j∈Ωh0i
(xjyj + αjyj + βjxj + αjβj)
+
1
n
h1
i
∑
j∈Ωh1i
(
√
λx2j +
√
λαjxj + βjxj + αjβj), (5.10)
where n
h0
i and n
h1
i are the number of pixels in Ω
h0
i and Ω
h1
i that surrounds pixel qi,
respectively. xj and yj are independent in the second summation term for region
Ω
h0
i . Therefore,
ρi ∼ N (µ,Σ) (5.11)
where 
µi =
√
λσ2n
h1
i /d
σ2i = 1/d+ λn
h1
i σ
4/d2,
(5.12)
To drop the unknown λ and σ2, we finally rewrite Equation (5.12) as the form of
weighting µh1 and σ
2
h1 
µi = n
h1
i µh1/d
σ2i = (n
h1
i dΣ1 + d− nh1i )/d2,
(5.13)
where d = n
h0
i + n
h1
i . This is the final expression of the distribution of the decision
statistic in the boundary region. As shown in Fig. 5.6, if n
h1
i = 0, which means
the detection block entirely falls in the tampered region, i.e., n
h1
i = d, the decision
statistic ρi conforms to N (µh0 , σ2h0). As the block moves away and completely falls
in the non-tampered region, ρi follows the distribution N (µh1 , σ2h1). Note that in
Equation 5.13, we only concern about the number of non-tampered pixels, so we
will drop the superscript “h1” for “n
h1
i ” afterwards. After analyzing the correlation
distribution in the problematic area near the boundary of the tampered and the
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non-tampered regions, we therefore propose an algorithm to alleviate the missing
detection problem as follows:
1. Calculate the correlation ρi between the noise residual wNi and the estimated
reference SPN signal rNi within the detection block Ni centered at pixel qi.
2. Estimate the expected correlation ρ¯i and the variance σ
2
h1
of the NCC coeffi-
cients under hypothesis h1 using the correlation predictor proposed in [9];
3. Select two thresholds γ and θ to obtain an initial detection result uˆi using
Equation (5.3) and (5.4).
4. Obtain the number ni of pixels in the detection block centered at pixel qi that
belong to the non-tampered region by convoluting a n×n matrix of ones with
the initial detection result.
5. Calculate a new threshold γi for each pixel by solving the following equation
1
σi
∫ γi
−∞
e
− (t−µi)
2
2σ2
i dt =
∫ γ
−∞
e−
t2
2 dt, (5.14)
where 
µi = ρ¯ini/d
σ2i = (σ
2
h1
dni + d− ni)/d2.
(5.15)
The purpose of Equation (5.14) is to guarantee the same desired FAR along
the boundary as in other regions according to the altered distribution as for-
mulated in Equation (5.13).
6. Label a pixel qi as tampered (uˆi = 1) if ρi < γi.
7. Label a tampered pixel (uˆi = 1) as non-tampered if
1√
2piσh1
∫ γ
−∞
e
− (t−ρ¯i)
2
2σ2
h1 dt > θ. (5.16)
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Figure 5.6: How the correlation distribution changes as the detection block moves
across the boundary region.
5.4 Experiments
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we will report some preliminary experiments meant to support the
idea of weighting the threshold accordingly along the boundary to improve the
detection resolution. Our experiments were carried out on images taken by six
cameras, a Canon IXUS 850IS, a Canon PowerShot A400, a Canon IXY500, a
FujiFilm FinePix S602, a FujiFilm FinePix A920, and a Olympus C730UZ. The
images contain a wide variety of natural indoor and outdoor scenes taken during
holidays, around campus and cities, in offices and laboratories, etc. For each camera,
80 randomly selected natural images were used for training the correlation predictor,
and another 50 blue sky images were used for constructing the reference SPN, which
is further preprocessed by the algorithm proposed in [118] to make the correlation
distribution under hypothesis h0 fit better to the theoretical distribution N (0, 1/d).
Another 100 testing images from each camera (i.e., 600 images in total) will be used
for evaluating the performance of the proposed algorithm. All images have the same
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size of 1024× 1024 pixels, and were cropped from the central region of the original
images of size 1536 × 2048 pixels. To improve the quality of the noise residual,
the nonlocal denoising filter BM3D [5] was used as the SPN extractor. Note that,
only the green channel of images was considered in our experiments, but better
performance can be expected by combining the results on other two color channels.
5.4.2 Detecting Simulated Forgeries
In the first experiment, we will evaluate the proposed algorithm by detecting sim-
ulated image forgeries. To generate the forged images, we randomly and equally
partitioned the 100 testing images of each camera into 5 groups. Denoted by
Gji [k], i = 1, ..., 6, j = 1, ..., 5, k = 1, ..., 20 is the kth image in the jth group of camera
i. Each of the 5 groups of one camera is paired with one group from other 5 cameras.
In this way, we can obtain 15 paired groups, i.e., {G11, G12}, {G21, G13}, ..., {G55, G56},
as shown in Fig. 5.7. In the paired groups, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the 20 images in one group and the 20 images in the other group. An im-
age, say G11[k], is forged by swapping the central image block with its corresponding
image, i.e., G12[k]. By doing so, the images of one camera are forged with the images
from all the other 5 cameras. To study how performance depends on forgery size,
we used forgeries of three sizes (i.e., the size of the swapped central image block),
384 × 384, 256 × 256, and 128 × 128 pixels, creating thus three test subsets of 100
images each. We also used detection blocks of three sizes, 256× 256, 128× 128, and
64 × 64 pixels. The performance is characterized by the ROC (receiver operating
characteristic) curve and the area under ROC curve (AUC). Like in [72], each ROC
is computed by varying γ from −1 to 1 and θ from 0 to 1, and then taking the upper
envelope of the resulting (FPR,TPR) points.
ROC curves obtained with different detection block sizes for different forgery
sizes, as well as the comparisons with the CFAR method [9], are shown in Fig.
5.8. The AUCs for forgeries of size 384 × 384, 256 × 256, and 128 × 128 pixels
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Figure 5.7: 15 paired groups for generating simulated image forgeries.
are presented in Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively. By refining the detection
results along the boundary, the proposed algorithm performs uniformly better than
the CFAR method. But the improvement varies from different forgery sizes and
detection block sizes. Generally speaking, the larger the forgery is, the easier it
can be detected. So it is not surprising to see that both the most significant AUC
improvement 6.99% and the best AUC performance 94.38% are achieved on images
with a forgery size 384 × 384 pixels. What may be rather contradictory to our
expectation is that, a larger detection block does not necessarily result in a better
performance. For example, if a 256 × 256 detection block is used to detect the
forgeries of size 128×128 pixels, the AUC can be as low as around 60%, but a much
higher AUC 88.5% can be obtained with a 64× 64 detection block. Actually, when
a large detection block is used to detect much smaller forgeries, the detectability of
the forgery will be dramatically reduced, because the forged region only accounts
for a small part of the area within the detection block, and the calculated statistics
would become irrelevant. For a reasonably large forgery, say larger than 128× 128
pixels, we found that a detection block of size 128×128 pixels delivers a satisfactory
performance.
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Figure 5.8: ROC curves obtained with different detection block sizes for different
forgery sizes. (a) Forgery size: 384×384, d=256×256. (b) Forgery size: 256×256,
d=256×256. (c) Forgery size: 128×128, d=256×256. (d) Forgery size: 384×384,
d=128×128. (e) Forgery size: 256×256, d=128×128. (f) Forgery size: 128×128,
d=128×128. (g) Forgery size: 384×384, d=64×64. (h) Forgery size: 256×256,
d=64×64. (i) Forgery size: 128×128, d=64×64.
AUCs
Detection block size d
256×256 128×128 64×64
CFAR 0.8393 0.8933 0.9006
Refined 0.9052 0.9438 0.9376
Table 5.1: AUCs for forgeries of size 384× 384 pixels.
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AUCs
Detection block size d
256×256 128×128 64×64
CFAR 0.7803 0.8709 0.8678
Refined 0.8425 0.9219 0.9235
Table 5.2: AUCs for forgeries of size 256× 256 pixels.
AUCs
Detection block size d
256×256 128×128 64×64
CFAR 0.6078 0.7727 0.8358
Refined 0.6101 0.8321 0.8850
Table 5.3: AUCs for forgeries of size 128× 128 pixels.
5.4.3 Detecting Realistic Forgeries
Apart from detecting the simulated image forgeries, it would be interesting to see the
performance of the proposed algorithm on detecting realistic image forgeries. To this
end, we generated three forged images using different types of forgery techniques.
As shown in Fig. 5.9-5.11, three different types of forgeries were involved:
• Scaling forgery (image 1): A direction board in an image taken by FujiFilm
FinePix A920 is enlarged.
• Cut-and-paste forgery (image 2): A car in an image is cut and pasted onto
another image. The two images are both taken by Olympus C730UZ.
• Copy-and-move forgery (image 3): A computer in an image taken by Canon
IXY500 is copied and moved to a new location in the same image.
All the three forged images have the same size of 1536× 2048 pixels.
We attempt to compare the proposed algorithm, which weights the threshold
controlling the FAR in boundary region, with the method based on the constant false
acceptance rate (CFAR) decision rule in [9]. The detection results shown in Fig.
5.9, 5.10 and 5.11, were obtained with detection blocks of sizes 256× 256, 128× 128
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and 64× 64 pixels. γ and θ were set to 0.01 and 0.05, respectively. The forged area
is highlighted in white, the correctly detected area is highlighted in green, while the
area falsely labeled as tampered is highlighted in red. The AUCs for image 1, image
2, and image 3 are shown in Table 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively.
The first image is a simple case, where an enlarged direction board is placed
on a smooth and bright wall. It is not surprising to see both the proposed algorithm
and CFAR can accurately detect the forged area even using a detection block as small
as 64 × 64 pixels. But the proposed refining algorithm clearly does a better job in
the upper and the bottom boundary of the forged direction board. Furthermore,
most of the “holes” in the middle of the forged area are filled up by the proposed
refining algorithm. The second columns of Fig 5.9-5.11 show the detection results of
the cut-and-paste forgery. As can be seen, the false positives are hard to avoid due
to the dark area of the traffic lights and the complex background, e.g., trees and
grass. In spite of the slightly more false positives, most of the forged car is reliably
detected. Similar result can be observed in detecting smaller tampered area, as
shown in the third columns of Fig. 5.9-5.11. The refined detection result reveals
part of the forgery in the stand of the monitor, which is almost ignored by CFAR.
Given the detection results in Fig. 5.9, we would like to point out the funda-
mental differences between our proposed refining algorithm and the image dilation
operation used as a post-processing step in [9]. If we compare the detection results
of image 2 given by the CFAR method and the proposed refining algorithm in Fig.
5.9, we will find that the refining algorithm extends the detected areas in the bot-
tom and the right part of the forged car, but it does not further extend the false
positive area on the upper-left corner of the forged car. In other words, the proposed
algorithm refines the boundary area by considering the neighboring information. It
is fundamentally different from the isotropic image dilation operation, which indis-
criminately enlarges the boundaries of forged regions and heavily depends on the
shape and size of the applied structuring kernel.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Figure 5.9: Forgery detection results for scaling (the first column), copy-and-move
(the second column) and cut-and-paste (the third row) forgery using a detection
block of 256 × 256 pixels. (a) Original image. (b) Forged image. (c) Predicted
correlation field. (d) Actual correlation field. (e) Detection result by CFAR. (f)
Refined detection result by our proposed algorithm.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Figure 5.10: Forgery detection results for scaling (the first column), copy-and-move
(the second column) and cut-and-paste (the third row) forgery using a detection
block of 128 × 128 pixels. (a) Original image. (b) Forged image. (c) Predicted
correlation field. (d) Actual correlation field. (e) Detection result by CFAR. (f)
Refined detection result by our proposed algorithm.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Figure 5.11: Forgery detection results for scaling (the first column), copy-and-move
(the second column) and cut-and-paste (the third row) forgery using a detection
block of 64 × 64 pixels. (a) Original image. (b) Forged image. (c) Predicted
correlation field. (d) Actual correlation field. (e) Detection result by CFAR. (f)
Refined detection result by our proposed algorithm.
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We also show the ROC curves obtained with detection blocks of different
sizes in Fig. 5.12 and report the AUCs in Table 5.4-5.6. By revealing more possible
forgeries along the boundary, the refined detection result apparently fits more closely
to the actual shape of the tampered area, which can potentially provide the forensic
investigator with more detailed information. What can be seen in Fig. 5.12 is that
the superiority of the refining algorithm seems more evident in the more challenging
detection tasks. The AUC improvement on image 1 is very limited, but on more
challenging image 2 and 3, the AUC improvement can be as high as 4.4%. It is
worth mentioning that when a small detection block of size 64×64 pixels is used, the
performance drops dramatically on image 2 due to its complex image background.
AUCs
Detection block size d
256×256 128×128 64×64
CFAR 0.9977 0.9985 0.9974
Refined 0.9989 0.9995 0.9992
Table 5.4: AUCs on image 1.
AUCs
Detection block size d
256×256 128×128 64×64
CFAR 0.9831 0.9563 0.8651
Refined 0.9944 0.9802 0.9092
Table 5.5: AUCs on image 2.
AUCs
Detection block size d
256×256 128×128 64×64
CFAR 0.9587 0.9522 0.9412
Refined 0.9882 0.9765 0.9604
Table 5.6: AUCs on image 3.
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Figure 5.12: ROC curves for three forged images obtained with different detection
block sizes. (a) Image 1, d=256×256. (b) Image 2, d=256×256. (c) Image 3,
d=256×256. (d) Image 1, d=128×128. (e) Image 2, d=128×128. (f) Image 3,
d=128×128. (g) Image 1, d=64×64. (h) Image 2, d=64×64. (i) Image 3, d=64×64.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a refining scheme for SPN-based detection of
image forgeries. We model the correlation distribution near the boundary across
the tampered and non-tampered regions and weight the threshold accordingly to
achieve the desired false acceptance rate. Despite some possible false positives (e.g.,
γ is set too small), the overall better performance has been verified in the tasks
of detecting both large-scale simulated image forgeries and three different types
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of realistic image forgeries. We believe that the proposed refining algorithm will
facilitate forensic investigators to get a more accurate detection result.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Future Work
The work presented in this thesis has been concerned with digital image forensic
techniques based on sensor pattern noise (SPN). Since SPN has been proven to be an
effective and robust form of device fingerprint, it has attracted considerable attention
due to its attractive characteristics such as uniqueness to individual devices, stability
over environmental conditions, and robustness against common image processing
operations. It has been successfully used for identifying the source device, linking
devices, and image forgery detection. In this thesis, a novel preprocessing algorithm
that suppresses the non-unique artifacts, shared amongst cameras subjected to the
same or similar in-camera processing procedures, has been proposed in Chapter 3 to
reduce the false positives for SPN-based source camera identification. A clustering
framework that deals with large-scale device fingerprint databases was also proposed
in Chapter 4. It is capable of addressing the NC  SC problem without a training
process and delivers a good clustering performance. Finally, for the task of image
forgery detection based on SPN, a refining algorithm was presented in Chapter 5 to
overcome the missing detection problem along the boundary area of the forged and
non-forged regions. The following three sections summarize the key contributions
and draw conclusions with regard to the three proposed algorithms. The directions
for future research will be given in the last section of this chapter.
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6.1 Preprocessing Reference SPN via Spectrum Equal-
ization
The performance of SPN-based source camera identification heavily relies on the
quality of SPN, which might be severely contaminated by image content, dark cur-
rent noise, shot noise, and periodic artifacts introduced by periodic in-camera pro-
cessing procedures, such as periodic sensor operations, color interpolation and JPEG
compression. These non-unique periodic artifacts are usually shared among the cam-
eras of the same model or brand, and often give rise to false identifications. There
are existing approaches aiming at suppressing these undesired periodic artifacts, but
we found that these approaches only suppress part of the periodic artifacts and leave
room for improvement.
Since the periodic artifacts manifest themselves as salient peaks in the DFT
spectrum of the reference SPN, we, therefore, proposed a spectrum equalization
algorithm (SEA) in Chapter 3 to detect and suppress the peaks in the spectrum.
Combined with six SPN extraction methods, the effectiveness of the proposed algo-
rithm was evaluated on the Dresden image database [53, 91] and compared to the
state-of-the-art preprocessing schemes in terms of both overall ROC curve and the
kappa statistic computed from a confusion matrix. The experimental results [118]
showed that the proposed algorithm can significantly improve the performance de-
pending on the size of image blocks. For example, the true positive rate at the false
positive rate of 1×10−3 can be improved by 10% ∼ 20% when the image block is
small (e.g., 256 × 256 pixels). Apart from the effectiveness of the proposed algo-
rithm, we also investigated its robustness against JPEG compression on our own
uncompressed image database. We found that SEA tends to be more robust against
JPEG compression for medium (256×256 pixels) and small (128×128 pixels) image
blocks, but ZM+WF outperforms SEA in the case of large image blocks (1024×1024
pixels).
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As mentioned in [53], some unexpected artifacts, which may stem from the
dependencies between sensor noise and special camera settings or some advanced in-
camera post-processing, were observed in the images taken by Nikon CoolPix S710,
FujiFilm FinePix J50 and Casio EX-150. So we conducted independent experiments
and presented detailed analyses for these three cameras. Despite no performance
improvement on large image blocks, the significantly better performance on medium
and small image blocks makes the proposed algorithm still favorable in digital cam-
corder identification and image/video forgery localization.
6.2 Large-Scale Image Clustering Based on Device Fin-
gerprints
In some forensic circumstances, it is desirable to cluster images into a number of
groups, each including the images captured by the same device, so that the foren-
sic investigators can link different crime scenes and evidence. This task can be
accomplished by resorting to the use of the SPNs (camera fingerprints) extracted
from images. Several approaches have been proposed to cluster device fingerprints,
but all of them are performed on the pairwise similarity matrix, which could be
computationally expensive to obtain for large-scale and high-dimensional camera
fingerprint databases. The difficulties of clustering large-scale camera fingerprint
databases can be further aggravated when the Number of Classes (i.e., the number
of cameras) is much higher than the average Size of Class (i.e., the number of images
acquired by each camera). We refer to this as the NC  SC problem, which is not
uncommon in many practical scenarios.
In view of the limitations of existing clustering algorithms, we proposed a
clustering framework for large-scale camera fingerprint databases that is capable
of addressing the NC  SC problem in Chapter 4. By taking advantage of the
dimension reduction and the sparseness of the similarity matrix, we first coarsely
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partitioned the entire database into small batches while keeping most of the fin-
gerprints of the same camera in the same batch. When calculating the similarities
between fingerprints, we applied the potential-based eviction strategy to guarantee
that larger classes will be clustered preferentially. Accurate clustering is then per-
formed on each of the small batches to produce a number of sub-clusters, which
will be merged based on an adaptive threshold calculated according to the quality
and size of the sub-clusters. The centroids of the merged clusters will be used as
“attractors” to classify the remaining fingerprints in the database based on their
similarities to the “attractors”. The above procedures will be repeated until all
fingerprints have been clustered.
The results on the Dresden image database showed that it exhibits high ca-
pability of conquering the NC  SC problem. For a challenging dataset consisting
of 50000 fingerprints with NC = 2500 and SC = 20, around 80% classes can be
identified. Compared to other camera fingerprint clustering algorithms, it has a
comparable performance on small datasets, but it is much faster and achieves a
better clustering quality than other clustering algorithms. Furthermore, it outputs
clusters with high purity, which make it attractive in many practical applications,
such as information searching and retrieval.
6.3 Refining Image Forgery Detection Based on SPN
SPN serves as the fingerprint of a camera, so image forgeries in the images taken
by the camera can be revealed by detecting the absence of the SPN signal. Because
SPN is a very weak signal, its reliable detection requires the joint process of a large
number of pixels. Therefore, SPN-based image forgery detection usually works in a
block-wise manner. The center pixel of a detection block is deemed to be forged if the
test statistic calculated on all the pixels within the detection block is smaller than
a predefined threshold. However, when the detection block falls near the boundary
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between the forged and non-forged regions, the test statistic is a weighting average
of two different contributions, which results in missing detection along the boundary.
Image level segmentation can be used to alleviate this problem, but it is helpless in
the scenario where the “occlusive” forgeries present.
In Chapter 5, we proposed a refining algorithm to address the missing detec-
tion problem along the boundary between the forged and non-forged regions. We
first detected the image forgeries using the constant false acceptance rate (CFAR)
method described in Section 2.3.2. With the initial guess of the boundary between
the forged and non-forged regions given by CFAR method, we analyzed how the test
statistic changes when the detection block moves across the boundary and adjusted
the decision threshold accordingly to correct the falsely identified pixels.
The improvement brought about by the proposed refining algorithm has been
confirmed by a large set of random forged images and three realistic forgery exam-
ples. We found that the improvement in terms of area under ROC curve (AUC)
can be as high as 5.4% depending on the size of detection block and the difficulty of
detection. Furthermore, the refined detection result apparently fits more closely to
the actual shape of the tampered area, which can potentially provide the forensic
investigator with more detailed information.
6.4 Future Research Directions
This thesis focuses on three tasks of digital image forensics, namely source cam-
era identification, source-oriented image clustering and image forgery detection, by
resorting to the use of SPN. Actually, digital image forensics is only a branch of mul-
timedia forensics, which is a much more broad and diverse discipline encompassing
the recovery and investigation of multimedia signals (audio, images and videos). A
multitude of directions for future work are opening up in front of us. Some possible
lines of investigations are as follows.
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1. In the SPN-based forensic tasks, a threshold has to be determined for decision-
making. This is usually done by applying the Neyman-Pearson criterion based
on the inter-class distribution. The problem is that the Neyman-Pearson cri-
terion only concerns about the inter-class distribution but without considering
the intra-class distribution. As a result, the threshold given by the Neyman-
Pearson criterion is not “optimal” in most cases. Taking SPN-based image
forgery detection as an example, the threshold determined by the Neyman-
Pearson criterion only guarantees that the false positive rate does not exceed
a user-defined value, but it might not be the threshold that “optimally” sep-
arates the forged and non-forged regions. A good threshold should be the
one concerns both the inter-class and inter-class distribution, the latter of
which heavily depends on the quality of SPN. However, this is very challeng-
ing because the quality of SPN is affected by many forms of interferences. We
presented a method to roughly estimate the quality of SPN in [124] and will
continue to improve it.
2. In [124], we modeled the true SPN signal as independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) White Gaussian Noise in very noisy background and developed
an ad-hoc clustering algorithm to address the NC  SC problem (i.e., the
Number of Classes is much higher than the average Size of Class) in large-scale
source oriented image clustering. We may have found a special case for a more
generic problem (e.g., when the i.i.d. assumption does not hold), which can
be applied to other modality of large-scale datasets and therefore is worthy of
further study.
3. As mentioned in Chapter 4, small classes may disappear in the final results due
to the inappropriate binarization. The difficulty of determining an appropriate
binarization threshold comes from the varying quality of SPN. In [57], K-
means (K = 2) was used to adaptively determine the reference similarity that
140
6.4 Future Research Directions
separates the inter-class and intra-class distribution. We also found that this
problem is also closely related with the problem of clustering data with various
densities. We will carry out further investigations to solve this problem.
4. Chen et al. proposed a correlation predictor in [9] to estimate the intra-class
distribution. They assumed that there is a linear relationship between the
correlations and the extracted image features and their second-order terms
(for more details, please refer to Section 2.3.2). However, we found in our
experiments that they do not strictly conform to a linear relationship, which
is largely responsible for the prediction errors. Therefore, another line of our
future research is to design a better and more robust correlation predictor.
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Derivation of Correlation Distribution
To simplify the derivation of the correlation distribution, some assumptions have to
be made. Following the assumptions in [125], we assume that each d-dimensional
fingerprint has the same quality and is standardized to have zero mean and unit vari-
ance before calculating the correlation. Presumably, each standardized fingerprint
can be modeled as the sum of the true SPN fi and other interferences αi:
F [i] = fi + αi, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., d, (A.1)
where d is the length of the estimated fingerprint, fi follows a normal distribution
N (0, σ2) and αi∼N (0, 1 − σ2) is White Gaussian Noise (WGN). For convenience,
σ2 will be referred to as the quality of the true SPN, while 1−σ2 will be referred to
as the level of the interferences in the standardized fingerprint. We further assume
that the fingerprints of two different cameras are independent. The normalized cross
correlation (NCC) ρ between two fingerprints or centroids, X and Y , is given in
Equation (4.3), where Xˆ[i]=xi + αi, Yˆ [i]=yi + βi, xi∼N (0, σ2x), αi∼N (0, 1 − σ2x),
yi∼N (0, σ2y), and βi∼N (0, 1− σ2y). Therefore, we can rewrite Equation (4.3) as
ρ(X,Y ) =
1
d
d∑
i=1
(xiyi + αiyi + βixi + αiβi). (A.2)
When it comes to the situation of determining whether to merge two clusters, we will
consider the two centroids averaged over the nx fingerprints in one cluster and the ny
fingerprints in the other cluster, respectively. Next, we will derive the distribution
of inter-class correlation and intra-class correlation in different scenarios.
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A.0.1 Scenario 1: nx=ny=1, σ
2
x 6= σ2y
In this scenario, we assume the qualities of the true SPN in X and Y are different.
Notice that it does not conflict with the assumption that the true SPNs of the
same class are of the same quality. Because even the qualities of the true SPN in
all individual fingerprints are the same, when different numbers of fingerprints are
averaged to estimate the centroids, the qualities of the true SPN in the resultant
centroids may vary significantly. In this scenario, although X and Y are referred
to as two fingerprints with different qualities, they can actually be viewed as two
centroids averaged over two clusters with different numbers of fingerprints. Under
this circumstance, we assume xi∼N (0, σ2), αi∼N (0, 1 − σ2), yi∼N (0, λσ2) and
βi∼N (0, 1 − λσ2). For two fingerprints of different cameras, using the Central
Limit Theorem (CLT), ρ(X,Y ) approaches to a normal distributionN (0, 1/d) when
d → ∞. But if X and Y are of the same camera, we have yi=
√
λxi. Therefore,
Equation (A.2) can be rewritten as
ρ(X,Y ) =
1
d
d∑
i=1
(
√
λx2i +
√
λαixi + βixi + αiβi). (A.3)
It is known that xi∼N (0, σ2), therefore x2i /σ2 follows the Chi-squared distribution
with 1 degree of freedom χ2(1). We can easily obtain the mean and variance for x2i :
E[x2i ]=σ
2, V ar[x2i ]=2σ
4. Based on the assumption that xi, αi, and βi are mutually
independent, we can easily derive the mean and variance of the ith element as

E[
√
λx2i +
√
λαixi + βixi + αiβi] =
√
λσ2
V ar[
√
λx2i +
√
λαixi + βixi + αiβi] = 1 + λσ
4.
(A.4)
According to CLT, when d→∞,
ρ(X,Y )
d−→ N (µ1,Σ1), (A.5)
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where 
µ1 =
√
λσ2
Σ1 = (1 + λσ
4)/d.
(A.6)
A.0.2 Scenario 2: nx > 1, ny > 1, σ
2
x 6= σ2y
Suppose X and Y are two centroids generated by averaging nx fingerprints and
ny fingerprints, respectively. In this more complicated and general scenario, if we
can figure out the qualities of the true SPN in X and Y , then we can use the
conclusion of Scenario 1 to determine the distribution of the correlation between X
and Y . For the centroids from two different classes, we still have the same conclusion
ρ(X,Y )
d−→ N (0, 1/d). For two centroids from the same class, we assume that the
qualities of the true SPN in all individual fingerprints in the same cluster are the
same, σ2. If n such fingerprints are averaged before standardization, the quality
of the true SPN, σ2, remains unchanged, but the level of interferences declines to
(1 − σ2)/n. So after standardization, the quality of the true SPN in the centroid
becomes
σ2
σ2 + (1− σ2)/n =
nσ2
(n− 1)σ2 + 1 . (A.7)
Replacing n in Equation (A.7) with nx and ny, σ
2 with σ2x and σ
2
y yields the distri-
butions for the ith element of the two centroids:
xi ∼ N (0, nxσ2x/[(nx − 1)σ2x + 1])
αi ∼ N (0, (1− σ2x)/[(nx − 1)σ2x + 1])
(A.8)
and 
yi ∼ N (0, nyσ2y/[(ny − 1)σ2y + 1])
βi ∼ N (0, (1− σ2y)/[(ny − 1)σ2y + 1]).
(A.9)
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Following the conclusion of Scenario 1, when d→∞, the distribution of ρ between
two centroids of the same class approaches to a normal distribution
ρ(X,Y )
d−→ N (µ2,Σ2), (A.10)
where 
µ2 =
√
nxnyσ2xσ
2
y
[(nx−1)σ2x+1][(ny−1)σ2y+1]
Σ2 =
nxnyσ2xσ
2
y+[(nx−1)σ2x+1][(ny−1)σ2y+1]
[(nx−1)σ2x+1][(ny−1)σ2y+1]d .
(A.11)
By setting nx=ny=1, Equation (A.11) becomes Equation (A.6). But in practice, λ
varies from different fingerprints, making the intra-class correlation distribution a
Gaussian mixture distribution rather than a unimodal Gaussian distribution. The
mean indicated in Equation (A.11) indicates where most of the correlations are
scattered around.
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